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-During the past decade, Congress has reshuffled the roles and responsi-
bilities of the parties to a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding and, in so
doing, has created an opportunity for creditors to play an important role in
the debtor's reorganization.1 In enacting the United States Bankruptcy
Code,2 Congress relieved the bankruptcy court of the burdens of adminis-
tering Chapter 11 cases3 with the expectation that the creditors' committee
would take a more active role in the day-to-day administration of the
debtor's reorganization.4 In several recent Chapter 11 cases of national
scope, creditors' committees have played a vital and often determinative
role in the outcome of the debtors' reorganizations.5 However, in the ma-
* This article, originally published in 67 MARQ. L. Rnv. 491 (1984), re-examines the
functions of creditors' committees in light of the statutory changes and developments in the case
law that have occurred since its original publication.
** B.S., University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point, 1971; J.D., Georgetown University Law
Center, 1978; shareholder, Reinhart, Boerner, Van Deuren, Norris & Rieselbach, S.C., Milwau-
kee, Wisconsin.
** B.A., Carleton College 1984; J.D., Harvard University, 1988; associate, Reinhart,
Boerner, Van Deuren, Norris & Rieselbach, S.C., Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
1. Under Chapter XI of the pre-Code law, creditors' committees played a very limited role.
In fact, under pre-Code law the very creation of a committee of unsecured creditors was discre-
tionary, not mandatory. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (1988) of the Code with 11 U.S.C. § 738
(1976) of the prior Act. Creation of a committee of creditors remains discretionary in liquidation
proceedings under Chapter 7 of the Code. 11 U.S.C. § 705(a) (1988).
2. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988).
3. See, eg., section 341(c) of the Code, which provides that the court may neither preside at
nor attend the first meeting of creditors, and subsection 1102(a)(1) of the Code which provides
that the United States Trustee shall appoint the members of the creditors' committee.
4. Congress intended the creditors' committee to be the primary negotiating body to aid the
debtor in its efforts to formulate a plan of reorganization and suggested that the committee, in
conjunction with the trustee, would oversee the debtor's activities. H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 401 (1977). See generally Trost, Business Reorganizations Under Chapter 11 of the
New Bankruptcy Code, 34 Bus. LAw. 1309 (1979).
5. See, eg., In re Texaco, 79 Bankr. 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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jority of Chapter 11 cases, creditors' committees have fallen short of Con-
gress's initial expectations and have failed to utilize the broad powers
available to them.6
The introduction of the United States Trustee system,7 in conjunction
with a growing familiarity among creditors of the potential power a com-
mittee can exert in the reorganization process, may well bring about
changes in the degree creditors participate in Chapter 11 cases. Changes
may also come about in the overall level of activity of creditors' commit-
tees.' As more creditors grapple with the decision of whether to participate
on a committee, counsel will be called with increasing frequency to explain
the role and function of creditors' committees. Questions concerning a
creditor's ability to challenge the committee's composition, reimbursement
of committee members' expenses, the committee's ability to intervene in
adversary proceedings or attack preferences, and potential liability to a
creditor arising from committee participation, necessitate that counsel be
prepared to educate and guide creditors who choose to play a role in the
debtor's reorganization.
This article examines the committee's function in a Chapter 11 proceed-
ing and focuses on the issues creditors and their counsel face at the various
stages of a case. Finally, the authors provide a blueprint for a creditors'
committee to follow to enable it to effectively use its statutory powers and
play an active and influential role in the reorganization process.
II. CREATION AND CoMPoSITIoN OF COMMITTEES
A. Initial Appointment
Section 1102(a)(1) of the United States Bankruptcy Code directs the
United States Trustee9 to appoint a committee of creditors holding un-
6. See infra note 248. A committee's failure to play an active role in a reorganization pro-
ceeding may stem from a lack of experience, a lack of knowledge about the law, or a concern that
a significant effort by the committee will not substantially improve the creditors' positions. In
addition, counsel may be unwilling to devote substantial time to the committee out of concern that
funds may not be available to pay expenses of administration, including counsel fees.
7. The Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 231 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 Amendments], expanded the role of the
trustee by instituting, on a nationwide basis, a United States Trustee System similar to that found
previously in the 18 "pilot districts" established in 1978. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-598, § 408, 92 Stat. 2682 (1978). In the 1986 Amendments, Congress assigned to the
trustee the duty to monitor the creditors' committee. 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)(E), as amended by
Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 113 (Oct. 27, 1986).
8. See infra note 250.
9. Prior to the 1986 Amendments to the Code, the court appointed the members of the credi-
tors' committee. In its continuing effort to relieve the court of administrative duties, Congress
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secured claims against the debtor as soon as practicable after the entry of an
order for relief in a Chapter 11 case. The section also allows the U.S.
Trustee to appoint such additional committees of creditors or equity secur-
ity holders as the U.S. Trustee deems appropriate.10
Although the Code provides some guidance, the U.S. Trustee may exer-
cise broad discretion when he or she appoints the members of the creditors'
committee.1' The Code suggests that committees of creditors appointed
under subsection 1102(a) shall ordinarily consist of those "persons" with
the seven largest "claims" 12 against the debtor, selected from those willing
to serve.13 The Code also permits the U.S. Trustee to appoint to the official
unsecured creditors' committee the members of a committee organized by
creditors prior to the commencement of the case provided, however, the
prefiling committee was "fairly chosen" and is "representative" of the dif-
ferent kinds of claims against the debtor.14
removed the appointment of committee members from the court's province and gave this respon-
sibility to the United States Trustee.
10. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1988).
11. The U.S. Trustee acts as an independent officer in selecting the members of the commit-
tee; however, the U.S. Trustee may solicit information and suggestions concerning the commit-
tee's composition. Van Arsdale v. Clemo, 825 F.2d 794, 798 (4th Cir. 1987).
12. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 521 and Bankruptcy Rule 1007(d), the debtor must file with the
court a list of its creditors with the twenty largest claims. This list often serves as a starting point
from which trustees notify creditors of the committee's creation. See, eg., In re Grant Broadcast-
ing, Inc., 71 Bankr. 655 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (trustee sent form orders to prospective creditors'
committee members requesting them to accept or decline committee service).
13. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1) (1988). Although committees are usually comprised of the largest
claim or interest holders, this is not always the case. In Bank Creditors Group v. Hamill (In re
White Motor Credit Corp.), 27 Bankr. 554, 557 (N.D. Ohio 1982), the district court affimed the
bankruptcy court's appointment of four small shareholders and two large shareholders to the
equity security holder's committee pursuant to subsection 1102(b)(2). These shareholders were
the only equity holders to respond to the request to serve on the committee. See also In re A.H.
Robins Co., 65 Bankr. 160, 163 (E.D. Va. 1986) (citing 5 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcY % 1102.0112]
(L. King 15th ed. 1986)), (the court held that the members of the creditors' committee did not
render the committee unrepresentative), aff'd Van Arsdale v. Clemo, 825 F.2d 794 (4th Cir.
1987); In re Featherworks Corp., 25 Bankr. 634, 644 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (bankruptcy court
held that a creditor has no right to serve on the committee solely because it is one of the seven
largest claim holders).
14. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1) (1988). Appointing a pre-existing committee to the official subsec-
tion 1102(a)(1) creditors' committee is often a quicker and cheaper method of forming a commit-
tee. Bankruptcy Rule 2007 sets forth the test used to determine whether the pre-filing committee
meets the Code's requirements of being "fairly chosen" and "representative." Creditors on a
committee formed prior to the debtor's filing would be well advised to follow the guidelines set
forth in Bankruptcy Rule 2007, as well as the rules relating to proxies in Bankruptcy Rule 2006,
to increase the likelihood that they will be appointed to the official unsecured creditors' committee
if the debtor files.
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The Code suggests that a creditor eligible to serve on a committee shall
ordinarily be a "person."'" Prior to the 1984 Amendments to the Code,16 a
"person," for purposes of the Code, did not include a governmental unit.' 7
As modified, however, subsection 101(35) includes within the definition of a
person, solely for the purpose of appointment to a creditors' committee,
"any governmental unit that acquires an asset from a person as a result of
operation of a loan guarantee agreement, or as receiver or liquidating agent
of a person . .1.8."I
Courts have broadly construed the scope of a "claim" under the Code.19
Thus, holders of disputed claims,2° secured and unsecured claims,2 and
holders of claims for damages that are considered unmatured, unliquidated,
and contingent22 are eligible to serve on the committee if they otherwise
meet the requirements for membership.
A majority of courts have rejected attempts to distinguish between indi-
vidual holders of claims against the debtor, and associations or representa-
tives, such as labor unions or trustees of pension funds, which represent the
individual claimants.23 In In re Altair Airlines, Inc.,24 the Third Circuit
15. 11 U.S.C. § 101(35) (1988). "Person" is defined in the Code to include an individual,
partnership, corporation, and, under limited circumstances, a governmental unit. Id.
16. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98
Stat. 333 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 Amendments].
17. See, e.g., Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. (In re Mansfield
Tire & Rubber Co.), 39 Bankr. 974 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (denying committee membership to wholly-
owned government corporation serving as trustee for debtor's pension plan); In re Baldwin-United
Corp., 38 Bankr. 802 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984) (denying Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
membership to creditors' committee); In re American Atomics Corp., 2 Bankr. 526 (Bankr. D.
Ariz. 1980) (denying school district membership to creditors' committee).
18. 11 U.S.C. § 101(35) (1988).
19. Id. at § 101(4); see also Robinson v. McGuigan (In re Robinson), 776 F.2d 30, 34-36 (2d
Cir. 1985); see generally Matthews, The Scope of Claims Under the Bankruptcy Code (First Install-
ment) 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 221, 223-38 (1983).
20. See, e.g., In re Richmond Tank Car Co., 93 Bankr. 504, 506 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988); In
re Churchill Coal Corp., 31 Bankr. 115 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
21. Section 506(a) allows a partially secured creditor to divide its claim into secured and
unsecured components, thereby permitting membership on the creditors' committee. See, e.g., In
re Walat Farms, Inc., 64 Bankr. 65, 68-69 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986) (a creditor whose claim
exceeded the value of its collateral, and thus held secured and unsecured claims, was eligible to
serve on unsecured creditors' committee).
22. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 57 Bankr. 680, 687 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
23. See, e.g., In re Altair Airlines, Inc., 727 F.2d 88, 90 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Chateaugay
Corp., 104 Bankr. 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); see also Chassin, Judicial Misinterpretations of Creditors'
Committees, 1 BANKR. DEv. J. 107, 115 (1984) (suggesting that union membership on creditors'
committee is consistent with the goals of the Code). But see In re Schatz Federal Bearing Co., 5
Bankr. 543, 547 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980) (court concluded that a labor union with a claim against
the debtor based on the debtor's failure to fund a pension plan pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement could serve on the creditors' committee; however, the union could not serve on behalf
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Court of Appeals held that the Airline Pilots Association International,
which represented pilots who held wage claims against the debtor, was enti-
tled to serve on the unsecured creditors' committee. The court noted that
the union was an unincorporated association and, therefore, an "entity"
within the meaning of subsection 101(9) of the Code.25 The court also re-
lied upon federal common law, which allows unions to sue to recover un-
paid wages and vacation pay, to find that the union had a "claim" within
the meaning of subsection 101(4).26
Recently, the District Court for the Southern District of New York, in
In re Chateaugay Corp.,27 adopted the reasoning of Altair. In Chateaugay,
a union brought an action against the debtor to redress alleged deprivations
of rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The court found
the union had asserted a claim for unpaid wages allegedly owed women
union members due to the debtor employer's discriminatory conduct and,
therefore, was eligible to serve on the creditors' committee.28
Creditors appointed as members of committees often designate agents,
such as attorneys, to serve on the committee on their behalf. However,
when an attorney represents more than one creditor who is a member of the
committee, the attorney may sit as a designee of only one of the creditors.2 9
Although courts permit creditors to designate lawyers as their representa-
tives on creditors' committees, they strongly encourage creditors to appoint
persons engaged in business. Such persons, reason the courts, are likely to
have greater insight into the business affairs of the debtor and, thus, be
better able to assist the committee in fulfilling its functions.30
of unpaid wage claims due its members under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, as amended (ERISA)).
24. 727 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1984).
25. Id. at 90. The court stated that "Congress has recognized estates and trusts as persons,
and thus as entities having claims against debtors. The representative capacity of such fiduciaries
is essentially no different, for purposes of participation in a Creditors' Committee, than the repre-
sentative capacity, under federal common law, of a labor organization." Id.
26. Id; see also In re Enduro Stainless, Inc. 59 Bankr. 603 (N.D. Ohio 1986); In re Northeast
Dairy Co-op Fed'n, 59 Bankr. 531 (N.D.N.Y. 1986). But see In re Allied Delivery Sys., 52 Bankr.
85 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (bankruptcy court refused the union's application to become a member of
the unsecured creditors' committee). Although the court acknowledged the union's claim for
purposes of subsection 1102(a), it found that the union had failed to demonstrate that the commit-
tee was unrepresentative of the general unsecured creditors. In addition, the court noted that
factors such as the adversarial relationship between the union and the debtor, and the union's
filing of an unfair labor practice charge rendered the appointment of the union to the committee
inappropriate. Id. at 86.
27. 104 Bankr. 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
28. Id. at 635.




B. Changes in Committee Membership
Prior to the 1986 Amendments, subsection 1102(c) gave the court the
power, upon request of a party in interest, to change the membership or size
of a committee that was not representative of the different kinds of claims
or interests against the debtor. When Congress repealed subsection
1102(c), it created a gap in the Code and left an unanswered question as to
how changes to the membership of existing committees could occur.31
The courts that have addressed this question have produced less than
satisfactory answers. In In re Public Service Co.,32 the Bankruptcy Court
for the District of New Hampshire expanded the existing creditors' com-
mittee by ordering the U.S. Trustee to appoint two additional deben-
tureholder members.33 Notwithstanding the deletion of subsection 1102(c)
from the Code, the bankruptcy court concluded that it retains the power to
alter the makeup of an existing creditors' committee. Although noting that
the statutory amendments cast doubt on the court's power to affect the ini-
tial formation of the creditors' committee, the court asserted that its power
to appoint a separate, additional committee of creditors necessarily includes
the "inherent power to provide a 'lesser included remedy' of simply di-
recting expansion of the existing committee."34 This novel approach, if
adopted by other courts, could dramatically enlarge the court's power to
fashion remedies.
In In re First RepublicBank Corp.,a the Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Texas denied the creditors' committee's motion to re-
move one of its members from the committee. Without stating the statu-
tory basis for the committee's motion, the court asserted that it had
jurisdiction over the "core matter" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(1),
(b)(2)(A), and (0).36 The court went on to state that section 105(a) author-
31. See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 1102.01, at 1102-18 to 19 (15th ed. 1990) [hereinafter
COLLIER] (stating that "the matter of the authority to alter the composition of the committee, and
possible grounds for such action, now become issues to be resolved by the courts").
32. 89 Bankr. 1014 (D.N.H. 1988).
33. Although the court ordered the U.S. Trustee to appoint two additional debentureholders
to the committee, it stated that the U.S. Trustee had "full discretion" in determining whom to
appoint. Ia However, the court directed the U.S. Trustee not to accept recommendations from
committee members who were not individual debentureholders and further "encouraged" the U.S.
Trustee to "appoint individuals with prior Chapter 11 experience if at all possible." Id. at 1021.
34. Id. (quoting In re Salant Corp., 53 Bankr. 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)).
35. 95 Bankr. 58 (N.D. Tex. 1988).
36. Subsection 157(b)(2) defines core proceedings to include, inter alia, (A) "matters concern-
ing the administration of the estate" and (0) "other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the
assets of the estate or the adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity security holder relation-
ship, except personal injury tort or wrongful death claims."
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ized the court, either on the motion of a party in interest or sua sponte, to
review the U.S. Trustee's decision concerning committee composition.37
However, the court added that unless issues of adequacy of representation
are raised, questions concerning committee membership must, in the first
instance, be directed to the U.S. Trustee.38
In In re Texaco, Inc. , the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District
of New York granted the debtor's motion to merge the members of two
separate committees of unsecured creditors." The court acknowledged
that the Code does not address the elimination or merger of creditors' com-
mittees. Nevertheless, the court decided that requests to change the mem-
bership or size of a previously appointed committee should be addressed to
the U.S. Trustee,4 and if the U.S. Trustee fails to act, the party in interest
should apply to the court for relief.42 In an effort to justify its conclusion,
the Texaco court construed the legislative history to the 1986 Amendments
as implicitly continuing the bankruptcy court's authority to alter committee
membership.
Although courts subsequent to the repeal of subsection 1102(c) have
altered the committee's composition, the statutory basis for reconstituting a
committee remains unclear. Section 1109 allows a party in interest to raise
any issue in a case and be heard on that issue. This section may serve as the
basis for parties to bring such challenges. However, the statutory basis for
37. First RepublicBank, 95 Bankr. at 60 (applying an arbitrary or capricious standard to its
review of the trustee's performance of his administrative role); see also In re Microboard Process-
ing, Inc., 95 Bankr. 283 (D. Conn. 1989), a case filed prior to the repeal of section 1102(c) where,
subsequent to the section's repeal, the debtor moved to reconstitute the membership of the credi-
tors'" committee. Both parties agreed that such relief was available under subsection 105(a) and
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) and the court, citing Texaco, asserted its authority to change the com-
mittee's composition. Microboard, 95 Bankr. at 284 n.1; cf. In re Public Service Co., 89 Bankr.
1014 (D.N.H. 1988) and In re Texaco, Inc., 79 Bankr. 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (courts may de novo
review propriety of trustee's appointment).
38. Cf. Texaco, 79 Bankr. at 566 (requests to modify committee membership may be made
directly to the bankruptcy court).
39. Id. at 567.
40. Id. In Texaco, the court justified the merger of the oil and gas industry creditors' com-
mittee into the general committee on the basis of changed conditions, such as the reduced
amounts owed the industry creditors, the dwindling number of industry committee members, and
the "astronomical" administrative costs and expenses that separate committees entail. Id. at 566-
67.
41. Id. at 565; see also In re McLean Indus. Inc., 70 Bankr. 852, 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (the
court, recognizing that it no longer had the power to change committee membership, suggested
that "[i]t would appear that a U.S. Trustee would have that power since he or she initially formed
the committee"); COLLIER, supra note 31, f 1102.01[3], at 1102-11 (stating that a party in interest
who objects to the domination of the unsecured creditors' committee by holders of secured claims
may request the United States Trustee to change the size or composition of the committee).
42. Texaco, 79 Bankr. at 566.
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either the court's or the U.S. Trustee's power to reconstitute committees
disappeared with the repeal of subsection 1102(c). Nevertheless, at least
one court has stated that cases involving the removal of creditors from com-
mittees have established a "tenet that survives the repeal of subsection
1102(c)," namely, that "[a] committee member holding a conflict of interest
cannot continue to serve."'4 3 This view, in addition to the resort by some
courts to subsection 105(a) as the statutory basis for reconstituting commit-
tee membership, warrants a discussion of removal cases, notwithstanding
the reliance of such cases on former subsection 1102(c).
Successful challenges to committee composition under former subsec-
tion 1102(c) typically involved impermissible conflicts of interest, risk of
compromising information that was confidential as to the debtor because it
involved committee deliberations, or risk of compromising confidential in-
formation concerning competitors because it involved the affairs of the
debtor. Speculative conflicts of interest or interests adverse to other com-
mittee members, however, will not result in a successful challenge to a com-
mittee member absent some specific evidence that the member "breached or
is likely to breach a fiduciary duty to, or has an actual impermissible con-
flict of interest with, the class of creditors represented by that member."'
Insiders have generally, although not always, been barred from serving
as committee members.45 In In re Swolsky," the Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Ohio removed from the creditors' committee a mem-
ber whose wife was the office manager, bookkeeper, and vice-president of
the debtor. The court stressed the risks to confidentiality of communication
among committee members and concluded that the presence on the com-
mittee of either the creditor or his agent would have a "chilling effect on the
43. First RepublicBank, 95 Bankr. at 61.
44. In re Microboard Processing, Inc., 95 Bankr. 283, 285 (D. Conn. 1989); see also Texaco,
79 Bankr. at 567; In re Grant Broadcasting, Inc., 71 Bankr. 655, 664-65 (E.D. Pa. 1987); In re
Enduro Stainless, Inc., 59 Bankr. 603, 605 (N.D. Ohio 1986); In re American Fed'n of Television
and Radio Artists, 30 Bankr. 772, 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (bankruptcy court refused to remove from
the committee a creditor who held 98% of the unsecured claims against the debtor).
45. In those jurisdictions in which the U.S. Trustee uses the debtor's list of its 20 largest
creditors as the basis for selecting a committee, insiders are usually not appointed. Although the
Code does not specifically exclude insiders from committee membership, Bankruptcy Rule
1007(d) excludes insiders from the debtor's list of 20 largest creditors.
46. 55 Bankr. 144 (N.D. Ohio 1985); see also In re Johns-Manville Corp., 26 Bankr. 919, 925
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Glendale Woods Apartments, Ltd., 25 Bankr. 414 (Bankr. D. Md. 1982);
In re Daig Corp., 17 Bankr. 41 (Minn. 1981) (court removed a creditor whose father was the
chairman of the board of the debtor); In re Penn-Dixie Indus., Inc., 9 Bankr. 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(an appointee to the equity committee who also sat on the board of directors of the debtor was
challenged and removed from the committee). In all of these cases the respective courts stressed
the need to protect the confidentiality of committee proceedings.
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other members"'47 and would result in a committee that was not representa-
tive of the different types of claims or interests to be represented.
In contrast, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Ver-
mont in In re Vermont Real Estate Investment Trust48 refused to deny com-
mittee membership to the wife of the former executive officer of the debtor,
who was an insider under subsection 101(25) of the Code. The insider cred-
itor was also a co-defendant with her husband in a state lawsuit alleging
fraudulent involvement in certain of the debtor's prior activities.49 The
court analyzed subsection 1102(b)(1) and found that because insiders were
not specifically excluded from service on the committee, the petitioning
creditor was entitled to membership. 0 Although the court required the
creditor to refrain from participating in any committee discussions regard-
ing her lawsuit against the debtor,51 it seemed unconcerned about other
confidential communications to which she might be privy, even though the
court noted that the objecting creditors were concerned about the risk to
confidentiality in general.5 2 Precluding insiders from sitting on a committee
under any circumstances is the better reasoned view because the success of
a reorganization proceeding may depend on the aggressive and sometimes
adversarial participation of a committee relying upon confidential
information.
Protecting information that is confidential as to competition was at issue
in In re Wilson Foods Corp., where an Oklahoma bankruptcy court denied
a direct competitor's request that it be permitted to serve on the creditors'
committee. The debtor contended that the creditor's service on the com-
mittee would impair its ability to deal candidly with the committee. The
court agreed, and added that if the competitor did not take advantage of
confidential information gained through committee membership, the com-
petitor's shareholders might have cause to complain. The court stated,
47. Swolsky, 55 Bankr. at 146.
48. 20 Bankr. 33 (D. Vt. 1982).
49. Unproven allegations of fraud have been held not to be sufficient cause to warrant re-
moval from a committee. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
50. Vermont Real Estate Inv. Trust, 20 Bankr. at 35.
51. Id. at 36.
52. Id. at 33; see also In re Nyack Autopartstores Holding Co., 98 Bankr. 659 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) in which the court allowed a creditor to continue service as the committee's chair despite
his being a cousin of the debtor's principal operating officer. Citing Vermont Real Estate Inv.
Trust, the Nyack court stated that subsection 1102(b)(1) does not exclude an insider from commit-
tee service "if the insider holds one of the seven largest claims against a debtor." Id. at 661; cf. In
re Featherworks Corp., 24 Bankr. 634, 644 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (creditor has no right to committee
membership just because it holds one of the seven largest claims).
53. 31 Bankr. 272 (W.D. Okla. 1983).
1990]
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"[c]onflicting interests and divided loyalties have no place on a committee
of creditors."54
Other courts have disagreed with the Wilson court's ban on competitors
serving on the creditors' committee. In In re Penn-Dixie Industries, Inc.,"
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York
permitted a creditor to retain its committee seat, even though the creditor
had filed documents56 with the Securities and Exchange Commission dis-
closing its intention to acquire ownership of the debtor. The court found
the likelihood of the creditor's misuse of confidential information to be
purely speculative, and concluded that the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure
contained provisions that could be invoked to protect against disclosures of
confidential information or breaches of fiduciary duties."
Similarly, the court in In re Plant Specialties, Inc.," approved the ap-
pointment of a representative of the debtor's competitor to the creditors'
committee. The court so ruled despite the debtor's objection that such an
appointment would create an impermissible conflict of interest between the
creditor's fiduciary duties to its constituent creditors and its individual self-
interest. The debtor also alleged that its trade secrets, such as customer
lists, would be exposed if the competitor served on the committee. The
court rejected the debtor's arguments and concluded that the debtor had
failed to meet its burden of demonstrating how the competitor's appoint-
ment would be "detrimental to [the debtor's] reorganization efforts."5 9 In
fact, the court went so far as to suggest that the competitor's presence on
the committee might actually prove to be to the debtor's advantage, given
the competitor's familiarity with the industry and his unique insight into
the debtor's affairs.'
Absent either an overt threat to confidential information or other bla-
tant conflict of interest,61 courts generally have not modified the member-
54. Id. at 272.
55. 9 Bankr. 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
56. Id. at 937.
57. Id. at 940.
58. 59 Bankr. 1 (W.D. La. 1986).
59. Id. In finding no "detriment" to the debtor, the court distinguished Wilson by noting the
dissimilarity of the facts in the two cases. Unlike Wilson, the competitor in Plant owned all of the
stock in its company and, therefore, would not be pressured by fellow stockholders to act in a
manner inconsistent with his duty to the committee. The court also took note of the competitor's
grasp of his fiduciary duty to all creditors as well as the competitor's previous knowledge of the
debtor's customer lists. Id. at 2.
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., In re Richmond Tank Car Co., 93 Bankr. 504, 508 (S.D. Tex. 1988) (creditor's
disputed claim and the fact that the parties were involved in pending state court litigation did not
create conflict of interest warranting creditor's exclusion from the committee).
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ship of a creditors' committee. Unproven allegations of fraud have been
held insufficient cause to deny committee membership to a creditor.62 Nor
has the existence of strong and diverse views,63 or the lack of sympathy for
the debtor's reorganization efforts, persuaded a court to remove a commit-
tee member. In In re M.H. Corp.," an attorney representing a number of
creditors stated at the first meeting of creditors, at which the committee was
to be formed,6" that his clients would object to any plan the debtor pro-
posed and would prefer to see the debtor liquidated under Chapter 7. The
debtor's counsel objected vigorously to both the creditors' and the attor-
ney's membership on the committee. The Ohio bankruptcy court, noting
that the Code did not preclude committee membership to unsympathetic
parties, refused to deny the appointment. 6
C. Committees in Addition to the Official Creditors' Committee
The U.S. Trustee may appoint the official creditor's committee and any
additional committees at his or her discretion.67 Additionally, subsection
1102(a)(2) provides that, upon the request of a party in interest,68 the court
may order the U.S. Trustee to appoint additional committees of creditors or
of equity security holders if necessary to insure their adequate representa-
62. See, eg., Vermont Real Estate Inv. Trust, 20 Bankr. 33; In re Bennett, 17 Bankr. 819
(D.N.M. 1982); In re Kontaratos, 10 Bankr. 373 (D. Me. 1981) (judge was sufficiently concerned
about allegations of fraud (the charging of interest at 350% per annum) to direct the United States
Trustee to investigate the charges. The First Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed,
stressing that such allegations had to be proved by resort to the adversarial system. In re
Kontaratos, 15 Bankr. 298, 301 (1st Cir. 1981)).
63. In Public Service, 89 Bankr. 1014, the creditors' committee voted to remove (and the
United States Trustee complied) one of its members who had expressed strong views concerning
the controversial Seabrook Nuclear Plant. Although the court noted that the member's views
were "strong" and the member was perhaps "even a little obnoxious in expressing the same," the
court stated that "the existence of strong and diverse views is not per se a disqualification for
service on a creditors' committee in a Chapter 11 proceeding." Id. at 1019.
64. 30 Bankr. 266 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
65. The first meeting of creditors is held pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 341 (1988).
66. M.H. Corp., 30 Bankr. at 267.
67. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1988).
68. A Chapter 11 debtor can be a party in interest for purposes of requesting the appointment
of an additional creditors' committee pursuant to subsection 1102(a)(2). In re Bible Speaks, 69
Bankr. 72, 73 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986). Prior to the repeal of subsection 1102(c), parties in interest
for purposes of challenging committee composition included the debtor, Penn-Dixie, 9 Bankr. at
939, other creditors, Vermont Real Estate Inv. Trust, 20 Bankr. at 35, and the United States
Trustee in pilot districts, In re Daig Corp., 17 Bankr. 41, 42 (D. Minn. 1981). Although not
specifically required by the Code, a party requesting the appointment of an additional committee
under subsection 1102(a)(2) should provide notice of such request to the trustee or debtor, the
creditors' committees, and the United States Trustee, and these parties should be provided an
opportunity to be heard on the issue. COLLIER, supra note 31, t 1102.02, at 1102-21.
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tion in the case.69 A committee appointed pursuant to subsection
1102(a)(2) enjoys the same rights and duties as committees appointed pur-
suant to subsection 1102(a)(1). 70
The Securities and Exchange Commission, which under subsection
1109(a) has the specific right to be heard on any issue in a case, frequently
requests the appointment of an equity security holders' committee in cases
involving large numbers of equity holders. 71 Although an equity security
holders' committee is the only type of additional committee specifically
mentioned in subsection 1102(a)(2), courts have broadly construed the sec-
tion's grant to create "additional committees of creditors" to include com-
mittees of secured creditors,72 priority creditors,73 subordinated note
holders,74 undivided interest holders,75 property holders,76 finance fund cer-
tificate holders, 77 labor representatives, 78 tort claimants,7 9 asbestosis liti-
gants,"0 hourly employees,81 retirees, 2 and industry competitors. 83
69. The court's decision to order the appointment of additional committees is discretionary;
the Code neither mandates nor precludes the creation of additional committees. In re Salant, 53
Bankr. 158 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); see also McLean, 70 Bankr. at 856-57; and Texaco, 79
Bankr. 560, 566 (holding that creditors seeking the appointment of an additional committee may
apply directly to the bankruptcy court). The court decides de novo whether an additional com-
mittee should be appointed. But see First RepublicBank, 95 Bankr. at 60-61 (applying arbitrary
and capricious standard of review to trustee's decision whether to appoint additional committees).
70. In re Evans Prod. Co., 58 Bankr. 572, 575 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
71. See, e.g., In re White Motor Credit Corp., 27 Bankr. 554 (N.D. Ohio 1982); see also In re
Emons Indus., Inc., 50 Bankr. 692, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (court refused to appoint an equity
committee in a case involving a "hopelessly insolvent" debtor, noting that "neither the debtor nor
the creditors should have to bear the expense of negotiating over the terms of what is in essence a
gift").
72. See, eg., In re Diversified Capital Corp., 89 Bankr. 826, 828-30 (C.D. Cal. 1988); In re
Fidelity Am. Mortgage Co., 19 Bankr. 568 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (secured noteholders' committee ap-
proved); In re Combustion Equip. Assocs., Inc., 16 Bankr. 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). But see In re
Wekiva Dev. Corp., 22 Bankr. 301, 302 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (court declined to appoint a secured
creditors' committee, noting the lack of identity of interests).
73. See, e.g., In re National Equip. & Mold Corp., 60 Bankr. 133 (N.D. Ohio 1986).
74. See, e.g., In re Nova Real Estate Inv. Trust, 10 Bankr. 90 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
75. See, eg., In re Bear Lake W., Inc., 32 Bankr. 272 (D. Idaho 1983).
76. See, eg., In re Cloud Nine, Ltd., 3 Bankr. 202 (D.N.M. 1980).
77. See, eg., In re Western Farmers Ass'n, 8 Bankr. 539 (W.D. Wash. 1981).
78. See, eg., In re Wickes Companies, No. LA-82-06657-WL (Bankr. C.D. Cal., July 15,
1983).
79. See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 65 Bankr. 160 (E.D. Va. 1986); In re Farm Bureau
Servs., Inc., 32 Bankr. 69 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
80. See, eg., In re Johns-Manville Corp., 26 Bankr. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); In re UNR Indus.,
23 Bankr. 144 (N.D. Ill. 1982); see also In re Johns-Manville Corp., 60 Bankr. 842, 843 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) (bankruptcy court appointed additional committees of institutional and trade creditors, co-
defendants of the asbestos manufacturers seeking contribution or indemnity, asbestos health re-
lated claimants and a committee of legal representatives of future health claimants), rev'd on other
grounds, 801 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1986).
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A party in interest seeking the appointment of an additional committee
must prove the necessity for the additional committee as well as the failure
of the existing committee or committees to adequately represent all credi-
tors or equity security holders.8 4 If the party meets its burden, the oppo-
nent must then show that the costs resulting from an additional committee
significantly outweigh the concern for adequate representation and cannot
be alleviated by other means. The nature of the case, the composition of the
committee, the presence of conflicts among creditors, and the delay and
costs arising from duplication of professional services are among the factors
the court weighs in determining whether to appoint an additional
committee.
8 5
In In re Sharon Steel Corp.,86 the Bankruptcy Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania vacated the United States Trustee's Notice of Ap-
pointment of Committee of Debentureholders. In refusing to allow the cre-
ation of an additional committee of debentureholders, the court recognized
that conflicts among creditors, are common in any committee, but that "ad-
equate representation exists through a single committee as long as the di-
verse interests of the various creditor groups are represented on and have
participated in that committee."87 The court noted that the appointment of
separate committees is an "extraordinary remedy," and emphasized its con-
cerns that separate committees often complicate negotiations, add delay to
the reorganization process, and add an additional layer of administrative
81. See, eg., In re Mesta Mach. Co., 67 Bankr. 151, 156 (W.D. Pa. 1986).
82. See, eg., In re Patrick Cudahy, Inc., 88 Bankr. 895 (E.D. Wis. 1988).
83. See, eg., In re Texaco, Inc., 73 Bankr. 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
84. A party seeking the appointment of an additional committee may apply directly to the
court for such relief and need not make an initial request to the trustee. In re Sharon Steel Corp.,
100 Bankr. 767, 776 ,V.D. Pa. 1989); Texaco, 79 Bankr. at 566; McLean, 70 Bankr. at 857-58.
Challenges to the representativeness of the official creditors' committee should be made promptly
after the U.S. Trustee appoints the committee. In Van Arsdale, 825 F.2d at 797, the court denied
a challenge to the representativeness of the official creditors' committee on the grounds that the
challenge, filed seven weeks following appointment, was untimely. Important decisions had been
made regarding the selection of attorneys and the formation of negotiation strategy and the chal-
lengers offered no reason for their delay in petitioning the court for an additional committee. Id.
However, in In re Diversified Capital Corp., 89 Bankr. 826, 831 (C.D. Cal. 1988), the court al-
lowed the appointment of an additional committee of secured creditors even after the confirmation
of the plan but prior to its consummation. Given the widely shared concerns with delay, disrup-
tion, and added cost, it appears unlikely that many courts would abide by the practice of ap-
pointing committees in the later stages of the debtor's reorganization.
85. In re Sharon Steel Corp., 100 Bankr. 767 (W.D. Pa. 1989); In re McLean Indus. Inc., 70
Bankr. 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Beker Indus. Corp., 55 Bankr. 945, 948-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
86. 100 Bankr. 767 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
87. Id. at 777-78; see also In re First RepublicBank Corp., 95 Bankr. 58 (N.D. Texas 1988);
In re Walat Farms, Inc., 64 Bankr. 65 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
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expense on the debtor's estate.88 The Sharon court added that separate
committees and the separate teams of professionals they entail "rarely con-
tribute to the spirit of compromise that is intended as the guiding star of
Chapter 11." 8
One of the major factors affecting a court's decision to appoint multiple
committees is the increased expense to the estate.90 The costs and expenses
of a committee, 91 as well as those of its counsel and other professional per-
sons employed by it under Section 1103 of the Code, constitute administra-
tive expenses under Section 503. The expenses are, therefore, entitled to
priority under Section 507 of the Code; they will be paid before the claims
of unsecured creditors. While in very large cases the direct impact on un-
secured creditors may be relatively minor, in small to medium-sized cases
the appointment of multiple committees could have a significant effect on
the ultimate distribution to unsecured creditors.92
When additional committees are appointed, their fees and expenses are
entitled to equal priority with the fees and expenses of the unsecured credi-
tors' committee. In In re Wilnor Drilling, Inc.,9' the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Illinois reversed the bankruptcy court's
ruling that the fees and expenses of the investors' committee were
subordinate to those of the official creditors' committee. Although the
court acknowledged that the appointment of a creditors' committee was
mandatory while the appointment of other committees was discretionary, it
held that factor alone was insufficient to warrant subordination of the inves-
tors' committee's expenses. The court concluded that the Code did not dis-
tinguish between the fees and expenses of various committees, and although
the court had the power to equitably subordinate claims because of fraud,
bad faith, or inequitable conduct, those factors were not present.94
88. Sharon Steel Corp., 100 Bankr. at 778-79.
89. Id. at 778.
90. See, e.g., Beker, 55 Bankr. at 949; In re Shaffer-Gordon Assocs., Inc., 40 Bankr. 956
(E.D. Pa. 1984); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 45 Bankr. 375 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
91. There is a split of authority on whether committee members are entitled to reimburse-
ment of expenses incurred in connection with a case. See infra notes 201-15 and accompanying
text.
92. See, e.g., In re Beker Indus. Corp., 55 Bankr. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (court appointed an
additional committee, emphasizing the size and complexity of the case, but nevertheless required
the newly-appointed committee to take steps to minimize duplication of the official committee's
efforts and to keep a close watch on the fees and expenses it incurs); see also In re Shaffer-Gordon,
40 Bankr. 956 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
93. 29 Bankr. 727 (S.D. Ill. 1982).




The courts are divided as to whether separate committees should be
appointed for each debtor in cases that are being jointly administered but
which have not been substantively consolidated. In In re Lee," the court
stated that it was "presumed improper" to appoint a single creditors' com-
mittee in related bankruptcy cases. In In re White Motor Credit Corp.,96 an
Ohio bankruptcy court which refused to appoint a single committee in six
related Chapter 11 cases commented that without separate committees,
"[t]he presence of disinterested yet voting members could easily divert at-
tention from legitimate committee activities (Section 1103) and chill the
initiative which, hopefully, has been brought to the reorganization
environment. 97
In contrast, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New
York in In re McLean Industries, Inc.,98 rejected a per se rule that the filing
of a joint case necessarily mandates multiple committees. 99 The McClean
court noted Congress' failure to address the appropriateness of multiple
committees in the context of jointly administered cases. Although it recog-
nized the concern that a single committee not be unjustly dominated by the
creditors of any one debtor, the court cautioned that the costs of mandatory
separate committees "could be extreme. ''"" ° The court ordered an eviden-
tiary hearing to determine whether a single creditors' committee could meet
the statutorily mandated test or adequate representation of the deben-
tureholders in four jointly administered but unconsolidated cases involving
related corporate debtors.
95. 94 Bankr. 172, 180 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
96. 18 Bankr. 720 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
97. Id. at 722; see also In re Parkway Calabasas Ltd., 89 Bankr. 832 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (pre-
sumed improper to appoint single creditors' committee or same counsel for creditors' committees
in bankruptcy cases involving multiple debtors where creditors treated debtors as economic unit,
debtors' affairs substantially overlapped and conflicts of interest among creditors were possible).
98. 70 Bankr. 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
99. Id. at 862; see also Salant Corp., 53 Bankr. at 161, (court refused to appoint separate
committees for three affiliated debtors with the same institutional creditors unless it could be
shown that a single committee could not function adequately). See generally Meir & Brown,
Representing Creditors' Committees Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 56 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 217, 221 (1982).
100. McLean, 70 Bankr. at 862.
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III. POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMFIEES
A. Appointment and Compensation of Counsel and Other Professionals
Section 1103 enumerates the powers and duties entrusted to creditors'
committees. 10 1 To assist the committee in performing its multifaceted role
in the reorganization process, Congress granted committees the power to
employ professionals. 2 At a scheduled meeting attended by the majority
of its members, the committee can authorize10 3 the retention of attor-
neys,'0 4 accountants,1°5 and other agents to represent and perform services
for the committee." 6 However, the ultimate employment of the profession-
als selected is subject to prior court approval.107
Although the committee enjoys broad freedom in selecting professionals
and agents, it does not have unfettered discretion. Subsection 1103(b) pro-
vides that a person employed by a committee may not represent any other
entity having an adverse interest in connection with the case.10 8 Prior to
the 1984 Amendments, this section barred an attorney employed by a com-
101. 11 U.S.C. § 1103 (1988).
102. Id. § 1103(a).
103. Although the Code does not precisely dictate voting procedure, one court has held that
the votes of a majority number of creditors holding more than one-half in amount of claims repre-
sented is required to select counsel. In re Outdoor Displays Welding & Fabrication, Inc., 76
Bankr. 860, 862 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1987).
104. The Code neither advocates nor prohibits the practice of retaining more than one attor-
ney for the committee. Although a committee, with the court's approval, may employ more than
one attorney, the legislative history suggests that such practice should "be the exception, and not
the rule." H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 402 (1977). See generally COLLIER, supra
note 31, % 1103.01, at 1103-04.
105. Although committees may not always choose to hire accountants, complex cases may
warrant the appointment of separate accountants for separate committees of creditors. See, e.g.,
In re Michigan Gen. Corp., 78 Bankr. 479 (N.D. Tex. 1987); In re Saxon Indus., Inc., 29 Bankr.
320, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (court authorized equity security holders' committee to hire separate
accountants). Collier suggests that where the debtor remains in possession and has a 120-day
exclusive period within which to file a plan of reorganization, the court should defer its decision of
whether to allow the committees to employ separate accountants unless the committee can show
the debtor's accountants are acting in a circumspect manner. COLLIER, supra note 31, % 1103-05.
106. However, the committee may not employ one of its current members. In re Automotive
Nat. Brands, Inc., 65 Bankr. 412, 413 (W.D. Pa. 1986).
107. Id. at 414. Bankr. Rule 2014(a) requires the committee's application for the employ-
ment of a professional to state the need for hiring a professional, the professional's name, the
reasons for the selection, the professional services to be rendered, proposed compensation, and the
names of persons connected with the case. The person to be hired also must submit a statement of
his or her connection to the debtor, creditor, or parties in interest. See also Bankruptcy Rule
5002, which prohibits appointment of a professional who is a relative of or is connected with the
bankruptcy judge who approves the appointment.
108. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(b) (1988).
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mittee from representing any other ientity connected with the case.' °9 The
obvious danger which the section sought to avert was the creation of an
irreconcilable conflict of interest in the event the committee and the second
entity took polar positions on issue.110
As amended, however, subsection 1103(b) opens the possibility for the
committee to employ an attorney notwithstanding the fact that the attorney
represents members of the comrmittee in connection with the case. The sec-
tion does limit such dual representation to those cases where the other party
represented does not have an "interest adverse"'11 to the interest of the
committee." 2 As the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Indi-
ana stated in In re Whitman, 113 "[t]he rule has been relaxed only to the
extent that dual representation of a creditor of the same class and the com-
mittee is not automatically prohibited.""' 4 In Whitman, the court refused
to allow the: attorney for a creditor holding both secured and unsecured
claims to represent the unsecured creditors' committee as well. The court
concluded that such dual representation constituted, as a matter of law, a
conflict of interest prohibited under subsection 1103(b)."15
109. See, eg., In re Combustion Equip. Assoc., 8 Bankr. 566, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (prohibit-
ing representation of both individual committee member and committee as a whole); In re Proof
of the Pudding, Inc., 3 Bankr. 645, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (prohibiting representation of more than
one committee in related proceedings).
110. United States Bankruptcy Judge Ryan described the concern as follows:
To avoid the manifestation of this conflict would serve both the interests of the parties as
well as the intergrity of this court. Neither the appointment of special counsel once the
conflicts materialize, nor the resignation of [the firm] (as they so willingly provide in their
affidavits supporting their respective applications) would be as suitable as denying the cred-
itors' applications in the first instance.
Proof of the Pudding, 3 Bankr. at 647. Although intended to avoid conflicts of interest, former
section 1103(b) often hindered the committee's efforts to obtain competent counsel and often un-
necessarily increased the expenses of administration. In re Whitman, 101 Bankr. 37, 38 (N.D.
Ind. 1989).
111. Although the Code fails to define an "interest adverse," the courts have spoken at length
on the phrase's meaning. See, eg., In re Grant Broadcasting, Inc., 71 Bankr. 655, 664 (E.D. Pa.
1987). Section 327(a) of the Code, which allows the trustee, with the court's approval, to employ
professional persons, employs the same "interest adverse" language and adds the requirement of
disinterestedness. 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (1988).
112. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(b) (1988). Once the applicant for appointment states that it meets the
1103(b) threshold, the burden rests with the party objecting to the appointment to prove the
contrary. In re AOV Indus., Inc., 798 F.2d 491, 495-96 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
113. 101 Bankr. 37 (N.D. Ind. 1989).
114. Id. at 38; see also, In re Grant Broadcasting, Inc., 71 Bankr. 655 (E.D. Pa. 1987); In re
Lion Capital Group, 44 Bankr. 684 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (prior representation of unofficial
committee not a bar to representation of statutory committee of unsecured creditors).
115. In denying the dual representation, the court also pointed to the "dramatically different"
interests of the secured and unsecured creditors. Whitman, 101 Bankr. at 38.
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The issue of when committees may employ professionals who also repre-
sent individual creditors has been litigated frequently during recent years.
In In re Rusty Jones, Inc.," 6 the creditors' committee sought to employ a
law firm which also represented individual creditors in claims against the
debtor. The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois rejected
the debtor's contention that the law firm was not "disinterested" within the
meaning of subsection 101(13)(E) because it held an "adverse interest" as
prohibited in subsection 1103(b)." 7 Absent a showing of an actual or likely
conflict of interest between the individual creditors and the committee as a
whole, the court refused to bar the dual representation."'
An attorney who violates the proscription of subsection 1103(b) may
risk the court's denial of compensation under subsection 328(c) of the
Code." 9 The court may also deny compensation in other instances.' 20 For
example, counsel may not be paid for administrative work, such as drafting
notices to creditors, notifying creditors of meetings, and drafting reports of
creditors' committees.' 2' Courts may also deny compensation to committee
counsel who performs services prior to the committee's obtaining court ap-
proval for the employment. Although some courts have allowed retroactive
116. 107 Bankr. 161 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989).
117. Id. at 165.
118. The issue of whether a conflict of interest exists has been frequently litigated. See, eg.,
AOVIndus., 798 F.2d 491; In re Davenport Communications, Ltd. Partnership, 109 Bankr. 362
(S.D. Iowa 1990); Whitman, 101 Bankr. 37 (attorney for creditor holding both secured and un-
secured claims barred from serving as attorney for unsecured creditors' committee); In re Oliver's
Stores, Inc., 79 Bankr. 588, 594 (D.N.J. 1987) (quoting American Bar Association Annotated
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, ABA Model Rule 1.7 (conflict of interest) (comment on
loyalty to a client), p.73 (1984)); Grant Broadcasting, 71 Bankr. 655 (denying dual representation
of individual creditor and committee if individual creditor hired counsel to litigate issues poten-
tially adverse to other committee members); In re UNR Indus., 71 Bankr. 467 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1987).
119. Attorneys and other professionals employed by the creditors' committee are paid from
the debtor's estate pursuant to subsections 330(a) and 503(b). Subsection 503(b)(4) also provides
for the payment of attorneys for prepetition unofficial creditors' committees. In re Medical Gen.,
Inc., 17 Bankr. 13, 14 (D. Minn. 1981). But see In re Jensen-Farley Pictures, Inc., 47 Bankr. 557
(Bankr. D. Utah 1985) (the court, notwithstanding subsection 503(b), denied attorneys' and ac-
countants' fees incurred by prepetition creditors' committee due to failure to show services per-
formed during unsuccessful nonbankruptcy workout provided direct benefit to estate).
120. Although subsection 328(a) authorizes the committee to hire professionals on any rea-
sonable terms and conditions, the section also authorizes the court to modify the professionals'
compensation if, after the conclusion of the employment, the "terms and conditions prove to have
been improvident in light of developments not capable of being anticipated at the time of the fixing
of such terms and conditions." 11 U.S.C. § 328(a) (1988). In addition, the court may deny com-
pensation if the professional person is not a "disinterested person" or represents or holds an inter-
est adverse to the estate with respect to the matter on which the professional is employed. Id.
§ 328(c).
121. See In re Barsky, 17 Bankr. 396, 397 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
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approval and thus compensation in cases where extraordinary circum-
stances beyond the professional's control prevented prior approval, 22 nunc
pro tunc orders are generally disfavored and courts have denied compensa-
tion for unauthorized services, even where the services were rendered to the
committee in good faith.123
All requests for compensation are subject to court approval and must be
reasonable in light of the circumstances relating to the particular case.
Compensation requests are evaluated pursuant to the criteria set forth in
Section 330 of the Code.124 These criteria include the time, nature, extent,
and value of such services, as well as the cost of comparable services in a
non-bankruptcy case."15 In In re Frontier Airlines, Inc.,26 the Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Colorado allowed the interim fees of a New York
law firm representing the creditors' committee in a Colorado case. The
court not only found that the employment of New York counsel was rea-
sonable in light of the complex nature of the case, but also allowed counsel
to base his fees on the rate charged in New York, the locale where he ordi-
narily practiced.127 In In re Bible Deliverance Evangelistic Church,128 the
court rewarded counsel for the creditors' committee for his efforts by
awarding twice his standard hourly rate. The court justified the bonus on
the basis of the active role counsel played in investigating the debtor's busi-
122. See, e.g., In re Arkansas Co., 798 F.2d 645, 650 (3d Cir. 1986); In re Brown, 40 Bankr.
728, 731 (D. Conn. 1984) (recognizing court's power to grant retroactive approval in rare or
exceptional circumstances not including the neglect of the professionals); see also In re Triangle
Chems., Inc., 697 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1983) and In re King Electric Co., 19 Bankr. 660 (E.D. Va.
1982) (suggesting counsel's inadvertence may constitute excusable neglect sufficient to warrant
retroactive approval); In re Freehold Music Center, Inc., 49 Bankr. 293 (D.N.J. 1985) (account-
ant's employment authorized nunc pro tunc); In re Bible Deliverance Evangelistic Church, 39
Bankr. 768 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (exceptional circumstances warranted nunc pro tunc order).
123. See, e.g., In re Whitmere Dev. Corp., 65 Bankr. 734 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986); In re Bear
Lake W., Inc., 32 Bankr. 272 (D. Idaho 1983); In re Lewis, 30 Bankr. 404 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
124. 11 U.S.C. § 330 (1982 & Supp. 1988).
125. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1988).
126. 74 Bankr. 973 (D. Colo. 1987).
127. Id. at 977; Jensen-Farley, 47 Bankr. at 579; see also In re Atlas Automation, 27 Bankr.
820 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983). But see In re Nova Real Estate Invest. Trust, 25 Bankr. 252 (E.D.
Va. 1982) motion for reconsideration granted inpar, overruled in part, 30 Bankr. 347 (New York
City counsel denied compensation at New York City rates if competent local counsel was avail-
able); In re International Coins & Currency, Inc., 26 Bankr. 256, 260 (D. Vt. 1982). The Frontier
court further allowed reimbursement of necessary travel time as well as time for conferences held
during meals. Frontier, 74 Bankr. at 978-79. See also In re Toy & Sports Warehouse, Inc., 10
C.B.C.2d 847 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984). Cf In re Windsor Communications Group, Inc., 54
Bankr. 504, 509 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (the court denied committee counsel reimbursement for the cost
of refreshments and lunches provided at conferences of creditors and parties in interest, finding
such costs personal expenses not properly chargeable to the estate under section 330).
128. 39 Bankr. 768 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
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ness and in negotiating a settlement in which all unsecured creditors were
paid in full.129 The court concluded that counsel should receive a bonus
above the normal billing rate if "the attorney's skill, diligence and experi-
ence so merit, or if the results obtained were particularly favorable in view
of the obstacles presented."' 130
To a certain extent, compensation awarded to professionals may also
depend upon the nature of the estate, even if the services provided otherwise
meet the requirements of Section 330. In In re S & S Industries, Inc.,13 a
Michigan bankruptcy court refused to require a secured creditor to pay the
fees of counsel to the creditors' committee when there were no unencum-
bered assets in the estate. Rejecting the committee's request that the court
apply subsection 506(c) of the Code, which permits a trustee to receive from
a secured creditor reimbursement of expenses incurred in preserving the
collateral, the court held, "[S]ection 506(c) enables a trustee to recover from
a secured creditor the reasonable necessary costs and expenses 'of preserv-
ing, or disposing of,' encumbered property 'to the extent of any benefit to'
such creditor. It does not confer this right upon a creditors' committee."1 32
The court concluded that although a secured party is free to consent to pay
such fees, such consent is not to be inferred by mere cooperation with the
debtor. 133
In In re 1606 New Hampshire Avenue Associates,13 1 the Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Columbia denied the unsecured creditors' commit-
tee's application to employ a law firm under a general retainer to be paid
from the estate. Although the court recognized that "appropriate circum-
129. The court also permitted counsel to receive compensation for time spent preparing fee
applications. Id. at 774.
130. Id. at 775; see also In re Baldwin-United Corp., 79 Bankr. 321 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987)
(permitting enhancement of "lodestar" fees where case was exceptional and involved inordinate
risk of loss); In re General Oil Distrib., Inc., 51 Bankr. 794 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985) (denying
counsel to unsecured creditors' committee a 30% bonus on fees); In re Wilson Foods Corp., 40
Bankr. 118 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1984) (permitting counsel a bonus of 15% over "lodestar"
amount).
131. 30 Bankr. 395 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983).
132. Id. at 397 (citation omitted) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (1982). Accord In re New
England Carpet Co., 28 Bankr. 766, 771 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1983), aff'd, 38 Bankr. 703, aff'd per
curiam, 744 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1984). But see In re Codesco, Inc., 15 Bankr. 354, 355-56 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1981) (court suggested that if committee counsel had benefited the secured creditor,
compensation would be appropriate under 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (1982)).
133. S & S Indus, 30 Bankr. at 398. But see In re Wilson Freight Co., 21 Bankr. 398
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (court awarded interim compensation to committee counsel in an "under-
secured" Chapter 11 in which assets were less than the secured debt where the secured creditor
ignored the bankruptcy judge's suggestion that the case be converted to a liquidation under Chap-
ter 7).
134. 96 Bankr. 406 (D.C. 1989).
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stances" might warrant such action, it denied the request due to insufficient
funds in the estate.135 However, where funds in the estate exceed the
amount of secured claims, committee counsel may be paid even if the un-
secured creditors receive no distribution pursuant to a plan of reorganiza-
tion. In In re Joyanna Holitogs, Ina,'36 a New York bankruptcy court
awarded interim compensation'37 to counsel for the unsecured creditors'
committee, although no distribution to unsecured claimants was prob-
able. 3 ' The court noted that committee counsel is indispensable in every
Chapter 11 proceeding where there are unsecured creditors, regardless of
how much such creditors receive pursuant to a plan. It is only after proper
investigation spearheaded by diligent counsel that a committee can evaluate
a plan that provides little or nothing to unsecured creditors. The court
concluded that to deny compensation to committee counsel because the
creditors will not fare well will discourage the investigation which is crucial
in determining whether a plan is feasible. 13 9
Finally, even though subsection 1103(a) does not specifically require a
person to be disinterested as defined in the Code, courts can refuse to com-
pensate professionals for services rendered and to reimburse them for ex-
penses incurred if, at any time during the employment, the professional
person is not a "disinterested person"'" or if the professional holds or rep-
resents "an interest adverse to the interest of the estate with respect to the
matter on which such professional person is employed."'' However, a pro-
fessional who adequately discloses his or her "interest" and receives the
prior approval of the court may be able to serve the committee and receive
proper compensation.
135. Id. But see In re Structurlite Plastics Corp., 91 Bankr. 813, 817-18. (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1988) (debtor not required to pay retainer to counsel for creditor's committee).
136. 19 Bankr. 406 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
137. Section 331 permits counsel to seek interim compensation once every 120 days after the
entry of an order for relief or more frequently if the situation warrants. See In re ICS Cybernetics,
Inc., 97 Bankr. 736 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989); In re Flagstaff Foodservice Corp., 739 F.2d 73 (2d
Cir. 1984); In re American Int'l Airways, Inc., 47 Bankr. 716 (E.D. Pa. 1985); In re UNR Indus.,
30 Bankr. 613 (N.D. III. 1983).
138. Joyanna Holitogs, 19 Bankr. at 408. But see In re Chips 'N Twigs, Inc., 58 Bankr. 109,
111 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (court denied committee's counsel's request for interim compensation to be
paid in full when estate contained insufficient assets to pay all other administrative expenses in
full).
139. Joyanna Holitogs, 19 Bankr. at 408.
140. 11 U.S.C. 101(13) defines "disinterested person." Jensen-Farley, 47 Bankr. at 579; see
also In re South Pac. Island Airways, 68 Bankr. 574, 578 (D. Hawaii 1986) (denying all compen-
sation to creditors committee's attorney who failed to disclose potential conflict of interest arising
from attorney's prior representation of debtor in matters related to bankruptcy).
141. 11 U.S.C. § 328(c) (1988).
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The courts are sharply divided as to whether the attorney-client privi-
lege exists between the creditors' committee and its attorney chosen pursu-
ant to subsection 1103(b).142 In In re Baldwin- United Corp.,"g3 the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio allowed the
creditors' committee to assert the attorney-client privilege." However, as
against its constituent creditors, the court required the committee to bear
the burden of showing good cause for not disclosing privileged informa-
tion. 4 The court rejected the argument that the privilege was in all cases
"inimical" to the committee's duty to provide the creditors with informa-
tion, and stated that "[t]he purposes underlying the privilege have no less
applicability to a creditor's committee than they do to any other entity, at
least when disclosure of privileged communications is sought by those who
are not represented by the committee, or who stand in an adversarial rela-
tionship with it."'"
In contrast, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California, in In re Christian Life Center,147 found that no attorney-
client privilege existed between a committee and its lawyer. The court
stated that although a trustee is a "mover and a shaker," '148 a committee
has no power other than to consult, investigate, and recommend. There-
fore, the committee should make its activities known to other creditors.14 9
142. The courts are also divided as to whether a lawyer-client relationship exists between the
attorney for the creditors' committee and individual committee members. Compare In re Levy, 54
Bankr. 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (refusing to find such a relationship) with Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp. v. Pincus, Verlin, Hahn, Reich & Goldstein Professional Corp., 42 Bankr. 960 (E.D. Pa.
1984).
143. 38 Bankr. 802 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984).
144. The court also found that the presence of nonvoting members during the committee's
discussions with its counsel did not threaten the privileged nature of such communications. Id. at
806; see Weintraub & Resnick, Creditors' Committee Compensation - Avoiding Attorney-Client
Privilege Conflict, 20 U.C.C. L.J. 288 (Winter 1988); see also In re Astri Inv. Management & See.
Corp., 88 Bankr. 730, 791 (D. Md. 1988) (newspaper enjoys first amendment right of access to
creditors' meeting unless specific evidence shows debtor would be less forthcoming in presence of
press, or presence of outside parties would interfere with orderly administration of proceeding).
145. In striking the balance between the creditors' need for information and the committee's
need for confidentiality, the court noted the unique nature of the committee's relationship to the
creditors it represents as well as the creditors' dependence on the committee for information. The
court analogized the committee's fiduciary duty to its constituent creditors to a corporation's duty
to its shareholders and applied principles from the corporation-shareholder balancing test stated
in Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1103.04 (5th Cir. 1970), cert denied, 401 U.S. 974
(1971).
146. Baldwin-United, 38 Bankr. at 804-05.
147. 16 Bankr. 35 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1981). The Baldwin-United court specifically declined
to follow the prohibition against asserting the privilege stated in Christian Life Center.
148. Id. at 37.
149. Id.
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The 1981 case of Christian Life preceded much of the case law concerning a
committee's standing to sue and to intervene in a case.15 It is unclear
whether these recently emerging "powers" would cause the Christian Life
court to see the creditors' committee as a "mover and shaker" deserving of
the privilege.
Christian Life may also be distinguished on its facts. The case involved
allegations which the Baldwin-United court agreed would bar the assertion
of the attorney-client privilege."5 Given the broad powers Congress
granted committees through subsection 1103(c) and the influential role
many committees play by bringing suits or intervening in a case, allowing
them the protections afforded by the attorney-client privilege, as outlined by
the court in Baldwin-United, is the better reasoned view. Any other result
could seriously hamper the committee's ability to effectively participate in
the reorganization process.
B. General Powers of a Committee
To enable a committee to carry out its role as a "watchdog" '52 of the
debtor's reorganization and to contribute to the formulation of a plan, Con-
gress granted committees of creditors or interest holders the following pow-
ers and duties:
(c) A committee appointed under section 1102 of this title may -
(1) consult with the trustee or debtor in possession concern-
ing the administration of the case;
(2) investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and finan-
cial condition of the debtor, the operation of the debtor's busi-
ness and the desirability of the continuance of such business, and
any other matter relevant to the case or to the formulation of a
plan;
(3) participate in the formulation of a plan, advise those rep-
resented by such committee of such committee's determinations
as to any plan formulated, and collect and file with the court
acceptances or rejections of a plan;
150. See infra notes 168-200 and accompanying text.
151. Baldwin-United, 38 Bankr. at 805, n.1 (attorney-client "privilege can never be asserted
as a shield to protect against disclosure of fraud or other misconduct on the part of the committee
or its attorneys").
152. In In re AKF Foods, Inc., 36 Bankr. 288 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984), the court stated that
"[t]he function of a creditors' committee is to act as a watchdog on behalf of the larger body of
creditors which it represents." Id. at 289. For a discussion of the committee's role as "watch-
dog," see Andrews, The Chapter 11 Creditors' Committee: Statutory Watchdog?, 2 BANKR. DEv.
J. 247 (1985).
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(4) request the appointment of a trustee or examiner under
section 1104 of this title; and
(5) perform such other services as are in the interest of those
represented. 1
53
As subsection 1103(c) suggests, a committee's role is to advise, not con-
trol, the debtor. 154 In In re UNR Industries, Inc.,"'5 the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois declined to order the
debtor to give the committee prior notice before implementing certain man-
agement decisions." 6 Noting that the Code empowers a debtor in posses-
sion in a Chapter 11 proceeding to continue its operations without day-to-
day input from creditors, the court concluded that if the committee believes
that the debtor is not capable of proper management, the appropriate rem-
edy is to move for the appointment of a trustee pursuant to Code subsection
1103(c)(4) and Section 1104.117
Committees are granted the broad power under subsection 1103(c)(2) to
investigate the operations and financial affairs of the debtor. As noted pre-
viously, such investigation is crucial to the committee's ability to make an
informed decision about the feasibility of a reorganization plan. 151 In a de-
cision which opens the door to an expansive reading of the committee's
power to conduct such an investigation, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Ap-
153. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c) (1988). As soon as practical after the U.S. Trustee appoints a com-
mittee under Section 1102, the Code directs the U.S. Trustee to meet with the committee "to
transact such business as may be necessary and proper." Id. § 1103(d). Congress granted the
committee many of the same powers as it granted the Section 1104 trustee. However, the commit-
tee "may" engage in the activities enumerated in subsection 1103(c), but the Code directs that the
Section 1104 trustee "shall" exercise its enumerated powers. In cases where their roles overlap,
the Section 1104 trustee and committee should coordinate their efforts to minimize expense and
avoid duplication. See COLLIER, supra note 31, 1 1103.07, at 1103-18 to 19, suggesting that de-
spite the use of the word "may" a committee's exercise of its subsection 1103(c) duties is "not
necessarily permissive," and committees have a duty to meet and monitor the debtor's activities.
154. COLLIER, supra note 31, $ 1103.07[3], at 1103-22; see also In re Johns-Manville Corp.,
52 Bankr. 879, 883-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 60 Bankr. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd on other
grounds, 801 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1986), on remand, 66 Bankr. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Pension Ben.
Guar. Corp., 42 Bankr. 960 (E.D. Pa. 1984). The Code imposes upon the debtor in possession the
duty to meet with the creditors' committee as soon as practicable after the committee is appointed
to transact such business as may be necessary and proper. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(d).
155. 30 Bankr. 609 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983).
156. However, Bankruptcy Rule 2002(i) requires that, unless ordered otherwise by the court,
committees must be provided copies of certain notices.
157. UNR Industries, 30 Bankr. at 612; see also In re Vancor S.S. Corp., 8 Bankr. 470 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1981).
158. See supra note 139 and accompanying text; see also Structurlite Plastics, 91 Bankr. at 819
(allowing creditors' committee access to information such as drafts of proposed sale agreements,
to enable committee to evaluate and take a stance on potential sale of debtor's assets).
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peals held in In re International Horizons, Inc,' 59 that there exists no fed-
eral accountant-client privilege which can be raised by a debtor to bar a
committee's access to necessary financial information. The court cited sub-
section 1103(c)(2)16 ° and concluded that the federal policy in the section
precluded the application of any such privilege recognized under state law
on the basis of comity. 161
Subsection 1103(c)(3) grants a committee the power to participate in the
formulation of a plan of reorganization.1 62 The committee may propose a
plan jointly with the debtor1 63 or, in the event the debtor's exclusive period
to file a plan has expired or has been terminated, 16 a committee can pro-
pose a separate plan of its own making. The Code further authorizes the
committee to advise its constituency about the merits or deficiencies of any
plan proposed. 165 Acting in this advisory capacity, a committee can exert
considerable leverage in negotiating the terms of a plan with any proponent,
and especially with the debtor. A negative determination by a committee
will frequently preclude a plan's acceptance 1 66 or confirmation. 167
C. Standing of a Committee
1. Standing to Commence Legal Actions
Section 1103(c)(5) authorizes committees to "perform such other serv-
ices as are in the interest of those represented."' 168 This broad grant of au-
thority has been interpreted to permit a committee to participate freely in
virtually every aspect of a case.169 However, one question concerning the
159. 7 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 584 (11th Cir. 1982).
160. Id. at 592.
161. Regarding the committee's attorney-client privilege, see supra notes 142-51 and accom-
panying text.
162. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(3) (1988); see, e.g., Structurlite Plastics, 91 Bankr. at 819 (most
important aspect of committee's function is to negotiate terms of plan).
163. See generally In re Gander Mountain, Inc., 29 Bankr. 269 (E.D. Wis. 1983); In re A.C.
Williams Co., 25 Bankr. 173, 177 (N.D. Ohio 1982).
164. Under 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (1982 & Supp. 1988), only the debtor may fie a plan during the
first 120 days after the entry of the order for relief, unless the court orders a shorter period upon a
showing of cause.
165. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(3) (1982 & Supp. 1988). This section also authorizes the committee
to file with the court acceptances or rejections of the plan.
166. See id. § 1126.
167. See id. § 1129.
168. Id. § 1103(c)(5).
169. See, e.g., In re All Prods. Co., 32 Bankr. 811 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983) (committee
objected to claims of the debtor's parent company); In re Huckabee Auto Co., 33 Bankr. 132
(M.D. Ga. 1981) (committee objected to plan of reorganization on the basis of improper classifica-
tion); In re Flagstaff Food Serv. Corp., 16 Bankr. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (committee objected to a
postpetition financing order).
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
scope of the committee's powers has spawned a significant amount of litiga-
tion: whether a committee may institute legal actions in its own name and
intervene in actions commenced by others.
The right to commence actions enables committees to exert a considera-
ble degree of control over the Chapter 11 proceeding. Debtors in possession
may be reluctant or even unwilling to seek recovery of assets, such as avoid-
able preferences or fraudulent transfers, from trade creditors whose good-
will may be vital to their post-reorganization prospects.170 Such reluctance
may prejudice the creditor body as a whole. A committee, designed to be a
temporary body and charged with ensuring equal treatment for all credi-
tors, may be the ideal party to prosecute such actions. In so doing, the
committee may improve the prospects of creditors generally, either by in-
creasing the total distribution creditors receive or, at a minimum, by facili-
tating a successful reorganization which will cure the financial ills of a
valued customer or supplier.
A majority of courts have recognized a committee's standing to sue.
Courts disagree, however, over whether that right arises under subsection
1103(c)(5) or under subsection 1109(b) of the Code. Cases that recognize a
creditors' committee's implied right to commence adversary proceedings
under subsection 1103(c)(5) generally have involved situations where the
debtor in possession, or the trustee, unjustifiably refuses to act and the com-
mittee obtains the court's prior consent to bring an action. 171 In In re
Monsour Medical Center,1 72 a Pennsylvania bankruptcy court found that
while the Code contains no express authority permitting a creditors' com-
mittee to institute an action, a committee has an implied right to sue to
avoid preferences and fraudulent conveyances when the debtor in posses-
170. As Bankruptcy Judge Babitt of the Southern District of New York has put it:
[I]t must surely be well known that Chapter 11 debtors seeking to reorganize and thereby
reenter the commercial world are understandably loath to sue those whose support they
need post-reorganization. The court here refers to suppliers, servicepeople, lenders and the
like and not to a debtor's insiders who have been treated too generously by a debtor on the
eve of its bankruptcy petition.
Joyanna Holitogs, 21 Bankr. at 325.
171. Receiving the prior authorization of the court may not always be required. See, eg., In
re Gander Mountain, Inc., 29 Bankr. 260 (E.D. Wis. 1983). But see In re V. Savino Oil & Heating
Co., 91 Bankr. 655 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); In re Nicolet, 80 Bankr. 733 (E.D. Pa. 1987); In re Amarex,
Inc., 36 Bankr. 59 (W.D. Okla. 1984); In re Toledo Equip. Co., 35 Bankr. 315 (N.D. Ohio 1983);
In re Chemical Separations Corp., 32 Bankr. 816 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983). The better approach
is to obtain court approval in advance of commencing actions, where possible.
172. 5 Bankr. 715 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1980).
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sion refuses to act.173 However, such refusal is not sufficient to support the
appointment of a trustee. The court concluded that any suit instituted must
be commenced on behalf of the debtor. 74
Courts have extended the implied right of a committee to sue to causes
of action other than those which seek to recover previously transferred as-
sets. Committees have been found to have standing to bring federal anti-
trust actions, 175 seek declaratory relief regarding the existence of leases,176
assert rights in unsold timeshare units, 7 7 participate in reclamation ac-
tions, 17  seek subordination of claims under subsection 510(c) of the
Code, 79 bring suit against the debtor's officers and directors for gross negli-
gence, mismanagement and breach of fiduciary duty, 8 ° and petition for the
marshalling of assets.' 8 '
Other courts have found that a committee's right to bring actions in its
own name is rooted not in subsection 1103(c)(5), but rather in subsection
1109(b). 1 2 Subsection 1109(b) provides: "A party in interest, including
173. Id. at 717; See also In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 107 Bankr. 518, 523 (W.D. Pa. 1989);
Coral Petroleum, Inc. v. Banque Paribas-London, 797 F.2d 1351, 1363 (5th Cir. 1986); In re STN
Enters., Inc., 779 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1985).
174. Monsour Medical Center, 5 Bankr. at 718-19. When a trustee or debtor in possession is
diligently pursuing legal action, committees have been barred from proceeding in their own
names. See, e.g., In re Wesco Prod. Co., 22 Bankr. 107 (Bankr. N.D. iI. 1982); cf. In re Ludwig
Honold Mfg. Co., 30 Bankr. 790 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983) (individual creditor held not to have a
right to seek subordination of a claim under subsection 510(c) where trustee had already filed a
complaint to subordinate).
175. See, e.g., In re Liberal Mkt., Inc., 14 Bankr. 685 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
176. See, e.g., In re AllBrand Appliance & Television Co., 24 Bankr. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
However, a committee has been found not to have the right to move for authority to sell property.
In re Calvary Temple Evangelistic Ass'n, 47 Bankr. 520, 524 (D. Minn. 1984).
177. See, e.g., In re Evergreen Valley Resort, Inc., 27 Bankr. 75, 76 (D. Maine 1983).
178. See, e.g., In re Original Auto Parts Distrib., Inc., 9 Bankr. 469, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(adversary proceeding seeking to reclaim goods under subsection 546(c) defended by the creditors'
committee without discussion of the appropriateness of the committee's standing).
179. See, e.g., Chemical Separations, 32 Bankr. at 819 (relying on 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b)
(1982)); see also In re All Prod. Co., 32 Bankr. 811 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (no discussion of commit-
tee standing).
180. See, e.g., In re E.F. Hutton Southwest Properties II, Ltd., 103 Bankr. 808 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1989); Louisiana World Exposition v. Federal Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1988).
181. In re Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co., 33 Bankr. 724 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (no discussion of com-
mittee standing).
182. Although the case did not involve the issue of standing in an adversary proceeding, the
rights of a committee under subsection 1109(b) were found to include the right to move for rejec-
tion of a collective bargaining agreement under Section 365 of the Code. In In re Parrot Packing
Co., Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 69,372, at 83,131 (N.D. Ind. 1983). The debtor refused to move to
reject the collective bargaining agreement because of fear that such rejection would constitute an
unfair labor practice under the National Labor Relations Act. Although the debtor actually sup-
ported the committee's application to reject, the court found that the debtor's refusal to act was
"unjustified." Id. at 83,137.
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... a creditors' committee... may raise and may appear and be heard on
any issue in a case under this chapter." 18 3 Courts that have analyzed sub-
section 1109(b) sharply disagree over whether the term "case" includes
"proceedings" instituted under the Code.
In finding a committee had standing to seek recovery of preferences and
allegedly diverted assets, United States Bankruptcy Judge Babitt of the
Southern District of New York in In re Joyanna Holitogs, Inc., 84 described
a committee's rights under subsection 1109(b) as follows:
Section 1109(b) continues the broad concept, carried over from the
1898 Act, of the broad right to be heard in order to insure that the
dark corners of commerce are illuminated. A general right to be
heard would be an empty grant unless those who have such right are
also given the right to do something where those who should will
not. In short, the right to be heard given the creditors' committee, 5
Collier on Bankruptcy (15th ed.) 1 1109.02 [3], includes the right to
sue where a trustee or debtor in possession will not. To hold other-
wise would frustrate Congress' decades-old effort to limit a debtor's
generosity with its assets.18 5
A contrary conclusion was reached by a bankruptcy court in Puerto
Rico. In In re Segarra,86 the court held that the term "case," as used in
subsection 1109(b), does not apply to adversary "proceedings." The court
found that Congress did not intend to create new causes of action in favor
of committees and, accordingly, dismissed the committee as a party plaintiff
in an action seeking damages from a creditor bank for improper dealings. 8 7
In those cases where a committee is found to have standing to com-
mence an adversary proceeding, the question arises whether the committee
is subject to the concomitant duty to bring suit. In In re Overmyer, 8 8 a
New York bankruptcy court pondered this question and concluded that a
Chapter 11 trustee seeking to reopen the time to file a complaint objecting
to the discharge in the separate Chapter 7 proceedings of the shareholders
of the debtor was not prejudiced by the committee's failure to commence
the action. Although the court ruled that the committee had a right to
commence suit, the committee was not burdened by the correlative duty to
183. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (1988).
184. 21 Bankr. 323 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
185. Id. at 326 (citations omitted).
186. 14 Bankr. 870 (D.P.R. 1981).
187. Id. at 878.
188. 30 Bankr. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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do so and its inaction therefore did not estop the trustee from taking
action. 1 89
2. Standing to Intervene
A related question involves the committee's right to intervene in an ad-
versary proceeding already commenced by the debtor in possession or the
trustee. The answer to this question often hinges on the court's determina-
tion of whether an "adversary proceeding" 190 constitutes an issue in a
Chapter 11 "case." 191 The circuits are in direct conflict on this question.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that a creditors' committee
has an unqualified right to intervene. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
has held that creditors' committees may not intervene in an adversary pro-
ceeding unless grounds for doing so exist under Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure 24(a)(2) or 24(b).
In In re Malin Motor Oil, Inc.,192 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
found that "cases" under subsection 1109(b) included adversary proceed-
ings, and held that the creditors' committee had an "unqualified" right to
intervene, 193 particularly when the trustee was lackadaisical in his pursuit
of the fraudulent conveyances at issue.194 The court concluded that the
participation of committees envisioned by Congress under subsection
189. Id. at 125. The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel has also addressed the right
of the committee to appeal an adverse decision in In re General Store, 11 Bankr. 539 (9th Cir.
1981). The court found that although it was not clear that a creditors' committee as an entity bad
standing to bring an appeal, the standing of the individual creditors on the committee provided a
sufficient basis to permit the appeal to be made. Id. at 541; see also In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d
1063 (2d Cir. 1983) (appeal by committee allowed without discussion of standing).
190. Bankruptcy Rule 7001 defines adversary proceeding.
191. For a discussion of subsection 1109(b), see generally Howell, Hyche & Sapp, Creditors'
Committees' Right to be Heard in Chapter Eleven Reorganization Actions, 37 MERCER L. REv.
1067 (1986).
192. 689 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1207 (1983); cf. Fuel Oil Supply and
Terminating, 762 F.2d 1283 (5th Cir. 1985) (pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 7024, committee may
not intervene in pending adversary proceeding unless grounds exist for doing so under FED. R.
Civ. P. 24(a)(2) or (b)).
193. Marin, 689 F.2d at 451.
194. See also In re Lee Way Holding Co., 105 Bankr. 404 (S.D. Ohio 1989); In re D'Lites of
Am., Inc., 100 Bankr. 612 (N.D. Ga. 1989); V Savino Oil & Heating, 91 Bankr. 655; In re
Longfellow Indus., Inc., 76 Bankr. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Hanover Indust. Mach. Co., 61
Bankr. 551 (E.D. Pa. 1986); In re Parrot Packing Co., 42 Bankr. 323 (N.D. Ind. 1983) (court
emphasized the committee's role in bringing creditors' concerns into the case in a timely and
effective fashion and held that the committee's ability to intervene should not be limited to situa-
tions in which the debtor engages in misconduct); Hunt v. Bankers Trust Co., 799 F.2d 1060 (5th
Cir. 1986) (creditors' committee right to be heard on determination of venue).
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1109(b) went far beyond the amicus curiae status afforded the committee by
the bankruptcy court. 195
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Fuel Oil Supply &
Terminaling v. Gulf Oil Corp.,196 declined to follow Matin and held that
creditors' committees do not have an absolute statutory right to intervene in
an adversary proceeding. The Fuel Oil court rejected the conclusion that an
adversary proceeding is a case subject to subsection 1109(b). Instead, the
court held that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provide for
intervention as of right197 and permissive intervention,198 govern a commit-
tee's motion to intervene in a bankruptcy adversary proceeding.1 99
Although it refused to construe subsection 1109(b) as an absolute grant to
committees of the right to intervene in adversary proceedings, the court did
state that committees have an absolute right to intervene under rule
24(a)(2) if the committee's interests are not represented adequately by other
parties.2°°
D. Reimbursement of Committee Expenses
The courts are sharply divided on the question of a committee member's
right to reimbursement of expenses incurred in connection with his or her
participation in a Chapter 11 case.20 1 Section 503(b)(3)(D) provides that
195. Matin 689 F.2d at 454; see also In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 107 Bankr. 518 (W.D. Pa.
1989); Nicolet, 80 Bankr. 733; Hanover, 61 Bankr. 551; In re D.H. Sharrer & Son, Inc., 44 Bankr.
976 (M.D. Pa. 1984); Gander Mountain, 29 Bankr. 260. But see In re Charter Co., 50 Bankr. 57
(W.D. Tex. 1985) (suggesting Main is no longer good law because it was decided prior to the
adoption of Bankruptcy Rules 2018 and 7024).
196. 762 F.2d 1283 (5th Cir. 1985).
197. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
198. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b).
199. Bankruptcy Rule 7024 applies FED. R. Civ. P. 24 to adversary proceedings under the
Code. See also In re Terex Corp., 53 Bankr. 616 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985); Charter, 50 Bankr. 57;
In re Calvary Temple Evangelistic Ass'n, 47 Bankr. 520 (D. Minn. 1984); In re Jermoo's, Inc., 38
Bankr. 197 (W.D. Wis. 1984) (creditors' committee had standing to seek continuation of debtor's
executory contracts); In re George Rodman, Inc., 33 Bankr. 348 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983).
200. Fuel Oil Supply, 762 F.2d at 1287; see also George Rodman, 33 Bankr. at 349-50, (the
court concluded that the right to intervene is permissive; the court highlighted the distinctions
between "case" and "proceeding" under Title 28 of the United States Code and the Bankruptcy
Code's separate rules for intervention in a case (Rule 2018) and a proceeding (Rule 7024)).
201. The courts appear to agree that committee members may not receive compensation for
their service on a committee or for time spent on matters not of benefit to the debtor's reorganiza-
tion. See, e.g., In re Mesta Mach. Co., 67 Bankr. 151 (W.D. Pa. 1986) (committee members not
entitled to compensation for time spent on development of employee stock ownership plan). For a
thorough analysis of the numerous decisions concerning reimbursement, see Pulliam, Yates &
Brewster, Reimbursement of Creditors' Committee Members' Costs and Expenses Under Section
503(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, 94 COMM. L.J. 93 (1989) [hereinafter Pulliam].
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administrative expense priority shall be allowed for actual, necessary ex-
penses incurred by:
(D) a creditor... or a committee representing creditors or eq-
uity security holders other than a committee appointed under sec-
tion 1102 of [the Code], in making a substantial contribution in a
case under chapter 9 or 11 of [the Code] .... 202
Thus, an individual creditor or a committee other than a section 1102
committee, which makes a substantial contribution to a case, may receive
reimbursement. However, a creditor who chooses to meet Congress's ex-
pectation that creditors participate actively in the reorganization process
through service on a section 1102 committee is denied reimbursement. As
one commentator has suggested, "[tjhis result is inequitable; it frustrates
the stated Congressional policy of encouraging creditors' participation in
reorganization cases .... "20 3
Some courts have interpreted subsection 503(b)(3)(D) to expressly pro-
hibit reimbursement.2' However, a slim majority of the courts allow reim-
bursement. 0 5 The myriad of cases discussing reimbursement of committee
members' expenses put forth widely varying rationales for denying or grant-
ing out-of-pocket expenses. A recently published compendium of such
cases2°6 suggests that courts deny reimbursement on the basis of the Code's
express prohibition,2"7 the absence of express statutory authority to grant
reimbursement,20 8 or the failure of committee members to show that they
made a "substantial contribution" to the reorganization case.2° Con-
versely, courts that grant reimbursement do so on the grounds that the
Code does not expressly prohibit such action,210 a perceived Congressional
I
202. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(D). Former Bankruptcy Rule 1129 authorized reimbursement of
expenses under the Act. Counsel to creditors' committees are entitled to compensation under
Code subsections 503(b)(2), 328(a), and 330(a).
203. Pulliam, supra note 201, at 97.
204. See, eg., In re Mason's Nursing Center, Inc., 73 Bankr. 360 (S.D. Fla. 1987); In re
Lyons Mach. Co. Inc., 28 Bankr. 600 (E.D. Ark. 1983).
205. See, e.g., In re Aviation Technical Support, Inc., 72 Bankr. 32 (W.D. Tex. 1987); In re
White Motor Credit Corp., 50 Bankr. 885 (N.D. Ohio 1985); In re Fireside Office Supply, Inc., 17
Bankr. 43 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981). See generally Pulliam, supra note 201, at 103.
206. Pulliam, supra note 201, at 103..
207. See, e.g., Mason's Nursing Center, 73 Bankr. 360; Lyons Machinery, 28 Bankr. 600; In re
Major Dynamics, Inc., 16 Bankr. 279 (S.D. Cal. 1981).
208. See, e.g., In re George Worthington Co., 76 Bankr. 605 (N.D. Ohio 1987); Mesta Mach.,
67 Bankr. 151; In re Automotive Nat. Brands, Inc., 65 Bankr. 412 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986); Wind-
sor Communications, 54 Bankr. 504; In re Air Haiti, S.A., 46 Bankr. 539 (S.D. Fla. 1985); Lyons
Machinery, 28 Bankr. at 601-02.
209. See, e.g., Farm Bureau Services, 32 Bankr. at 70; Lyons Machinery, 28 Bankr. at 602.
210. See, e.g., Aviation Technical Support, 72 Bankr. 32; General Oil Distrib.%, 51 Bankr. 794;
In re Global Int'l Airways Corp., 45 Bankr. 258 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984); In re Grynberg, 19
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intent to permit reimbursement, 2" bankruptcy rule 2016,212 public policy
considerations and equity principles,213 or a finding that the committee
member made a "substantial contribution" to the bankruptcy case.2" 4
Bankruptcy courts have taken a hodgepodge of approaches to the issue
of reimbursing committee members for out-of-pocket expenses. As a result,
creditors are often uncertain where their cases will fall along the spectrum
of reimbursement decisions. This uncertainty may play a role in the reluc-
tance of many creditors to serve on Section 1102 committees. Until Con-
gress enacts legislation to remedy the anomalous result produced by the
language of subsection 503(b)(3)(D),21 5 counsel should advise their clients
of the relevant bankruptcy district's approach to the issue of reimbursement
and should, at the outset of the case, seek an order from the court clarifying
committee members' rights to reimbursement.
E. Duties and Potential Liabilities of Committee Members
1. The Standard of Care: Fiduciary Responsibility
Members of a creditor's committee owe a fiduciary duty to the holders
of the class of claims or interests they represent.216 Committee members
must pursue their statutory function for the benefit of their constituency
Bankr. 621 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982) (interpreting subsection 503(b)(3)(D) as barring reimburse-
ment of a committee's expenses but allowing reimbursement of committee members' expenses).
211. See, e-g., In re I.E. Jennings, Inc., 96 Bankr. 500 (E.D. Pa. 1989); In re Northeast Dairy
Co-op Fed'n, Inc., 76 Bankr. 914 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987); Global Int'Airways, 45 Bankr. 258; In
re GHR Energy Corp., 35 Bankr. 539 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983). See generally Chassin, 1 BANKR.
DEv. J. 107, 120 (1984).
212. Rule 2016(a) does not specifically refer to creditors' committees. However, the Advisory
Committee Note suggests that the drafters of the Rule intended to include reimbursement of a
committee's expenses. The Advisory Committee Note to Bankruptcy Rule 2016(a) reads, in perti-
nent part, as follows: "Subdivision (a) includes within its provisions a committee member thereof,
agent, attorney or accountant for the committee when compensation or reimbursement of ex-
penses is sought from the estate." Bankr. R.P. 2016 Advisory Committee Note. See, e.g., In re
Malden Mills, Inc., 42 Bankr. 476 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984); GHR Energy, 35 Bankr. 539; In re
Pennsylvania Tire & Rubber Co., 25 Bankr. 18 (N.D. Ohio 1982); Fireside Office Supply, 17
Bankr. 43.
213. See, eg., In re Kaiser Steel Corp., 74 Bankr. 885 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1987); Malden Mills,
42 Bankr. 476; GHR Energy, 35 Bankr. 539.
214. See, eg., Kaiser Steel, 74 Bankr. 885; In re Food Workshop, Inc., 70 Bankr. 962 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Evans Prods. Co., 62 Bankr. 579 (S.D. Fla. 1986); Windsor Communica-
tions Group, 54 Bankr. 504.
215. Repeated efforts to address the issue through a Technical Amendments Act, which
would specifically authorize reimbursement of committee expenses, have proven unsuccessful.
216. See, eg., Woods v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262 (1941); Bohack Corp. v.
Gulf& W. Indus., Inc., 607 F.2d 258 (2d Cir. 1979); In re Realty Assocs. See. Corp., 56 F. Supp.
1008 (E.D.N.Y. 1944), aff'd, 156 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1946); Mesta Mach., 67 Bankr. at 156; In re
REA Holding Corp., 8 Bankr. 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). See generally DeNatale, The Creditors' Corn-
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with an undivided loyalty.217 Because of this absolute requirement, some
courts have refused to appoint overlapping committees, 18 and others have
declined to approve the selection of the same counsel for different commit-
tees in related cases.2 19 The potential for conflicts of interest is to be scru-
pulously avoided, even if no actual conflict exists at the time committee
members are initially appointed or counsel is retained.22
As a fiduciary, a committee member must not use his or her position to
further personal interests at the expense of other creditors.221 If a commit-
tee member does abuse the fiduciary trust by promoting personal interests
over those of the committee,2 22 courts will not hesitate to impose sanctions.
Illustrative is In re Johns Manville Corp. 223 where a member of the Asbes-
tos Committee, who was also an attorney, continued a prepetition lawsuit
against the debtor on behalf of a private client. The bankruptcy court, after
condemning the creditor's attempts to advance prepetition claims at the
postpetition stage without first securing relief from the automatic stay,224
commented at length upon the nature of a committee member's fiduciary
duty:
In the case of reorganization committees, these fiduciary duties
are crucial because of the importance of committees. Reorganiza-
tion committees are the primary negotiating bodies for the plan of
reorganization. They represent those classes of creditors from which
they are selected. They also provide supervision of the debtor and
execute an oversight function in protecting their constituents'
interests....
Accordingly, the individuals constituting a committee should be
honest, loyal, trustworthy and without conflicting interests, and with
mittee Under the Bankruptcy Code - A Primer, 55 AM. BANKR. L.J. 43 (1981); Levy, Creditors'
Committees and Their Responsibilities, 74 COMM. L.J. 355 (1969).
217. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 26 Bankr. 919, 925 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
218. See, eg., White Motor Credit, 18 Bankr. at 722; cf. supra notes 99-100 and accompany-
ing text.
219. See, eg., Proof of the Pudding, 3 Bankr. at 648.
220. Id. at 647.
221. See, eg., In re National Equip. & Mold Corp., 33 Bankr. 574 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983);
Johns-Manville, 26 Bankr. 919; see also In re Enduro Stainless, Inc., 59 Bankr. 603, 605 (N.D.
Ohio 1986) (the court stated that the union may not act through the committee to further only its
self-interests).
222. If a committee member's actions are challenged, the member as a fiduciary, must prove
that the challenged transaction was made in good faith; the member must also show the transac-
tion's "inherent fairness from the viewpoint of those that the fiduciary represents." Mesta Mach.,
67 Bankr. at 157, (citing Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939)).
223. 26 Bankr. 919 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
224. The automatic stay, imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982), stays, inter alia, acts to obtain
property of the estate or from the estate.
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undivided loyalty and allegiance to their constituents.... Conflicts
of interest on the part of representative persons or committees are
thus not be [sic] tolerated.... [W]here a committee representative or
agent seeks to represent or advance the interest of an individual
member of a competing class of creditors or various interests or
groups whose purposes and desires are dissimilar, this fiduciary is in
breach of his duty of loyal and disinterested service.22
The court concluded that the committee member misused confidential
committee information in furthering a private cause and stated that such
abuse constituted a breach of the member's fiduciary duty. The court fined
the attorney and his law firm the amount of compensatory damages caused
by their misconduct, not to exceed $5,000.226
The scope of a committee member's fiduciary duty and the possible im-
munity the Code provides to committee members was at issue in In re
Tucker Freight Lines, Inc. 227 In Tucker, a debtor and an unsecured credi-
tor sued individual members of the creditors' committee, alleging that the
members made false and misleading statements in the committee's letter to
its constituents. The letter recommended that the creditors reject the
debtor's plan of reorganization and, as alleged by the debtor, resulted in the
plan's denial and the eventual conversion of the case to a Chapter 7 liquida-
tion proceeding. The debtor alleged that the committee members engaged
in a "fraudulent scheme" in violation of their fiduciary duties, the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,228 and the popular Racketeer Influence and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO"). 2 9 In response, the committee members as-
serted that subsection 1103(c) of the Code shielded them with an absolute
immunity for actions they took while serving on the committee.230
225. Johns-Manville, 26 Bankr. at 925 (citations omitted).
226. Id. at 926; see also National Equip., 33 Bankr. at 575-76 (a union member of the priority
creditors' committee petitioned the court to order the debtor, at estate expense, to retract certain
adverse statements made about the union prepetition; the court refused and chastised the union
for attempting to use its committee membership to further personal interests); In re Flagstaff
Foodservice Corp., 14 Bankr. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (court questioned a committee's attempt to
seek reclamation for some, but not all, unsecured creditors).
227. 62 Bankr. 213 (W.D. Mich. 1986).
228. 15 U.S.C. § 78.
229. Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.
230. Tucker, 62 Bankr. at 216. The members argued that since their actions were taken
pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code and with the court's permission, they should be immune from
liability. They further argued that "if the Bankruptcy Code is to function, creditors' committees
must share the same absolute immunity held by judges and trustees." Id. The court responded
that the committee's letter urging creditors to reject the plan exceeded the scope contemplated by
the court and added that the absolute immunity sought by the committee members is not even
enjoyed by trustees who may be held personally responsible for intentional wrongs. Id. at 216-17.
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The Tucker court acknowledged that the committee's power to advise
creditors of its determinations as to a plan pursuant to subsection 1103(c)
may include an implicit grant of limited immunity. However, the court
added that subsection 1103(c) imposes a concurrent fiduciary duty which
[a]t a minimum, ... requires that the committee's determinations
must be honestly arrived at, and, to the greatest degree possible, also
accurate and correct. For a Creditors' Committee to urge rejection
of a plan for reasons they knew, or would have known but for their
recklessness, to be false would violate this duty and deprive them of
any limited immunity they might otherwise hold under
§ 1103(c)(3).231
Surprisingly, few decisions under the Code impose liability on commit-
tees or their members for failing to exercise the statutory powers that enable
committees to participate actively in the reorganization process. 232 Perhaps
the same apathy and sense of hopelessness which often results in inactive
committees also produces creditors who fail to consider whether the com-
mittee properly represented their interests. Even if a creditor chooses to
pursue a claim against an inactive committee, damages may be quite diffi-
cult to prove. Establishing that the committee failed to fulfill its fiduciary
responsibilities may not, in itself, conclusively demonstrate that a better re-
sult would have been achieved if the committee had fully utilized its statu-
tory powers. However, heightened awareness among creditors and their
counsel2 33 about the committee's responsibilities to those it represents may
result in the emergence of claims against inactive committees and commit-
tee members. Such claims might prompt the committee, as well as future
committees, to carry out more fully and effectively the role Congress in-
tended them to play in the reorganization process.
2. Securities Law Liability
As stated above, subsection 1103(c)(3) authorizes a committee to par-
ticipate in the formulation of a plan of reorganization. Once the debtor's
231. Id. at 216.
232. The Code fails to define the minimum level of acceptable committee activity. See Pen-
sion Benefit Guar., 42 Bankr. at 963 (the court hints that the committee may be liable for its
failure to exercise due care in carrying out its statutory duty).
233. Creditors and their counsel may develop a heightened awareness of the committee's role
from the publicity received by creditors' committees in national cases during recent years as well
as from the renewed attention to creditors' committees which may be precipitated by the U.S.
Trustee's active participation in Chapter 11 proceedings. In addition, during the decade since the
Code's enactment, creditors and their counsel have become educated as to the Code's complexities
and the multifaceted rights of creditors. As a result, creditors may become more inclined to seek
redress against inactive committees and their members.
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exclusive period to file a plan expires or terminates,234 a committee may
propose a plan on its own or in connection with another party. However,
before it seeks acceptances, the committee, as a proponent of the plan, must
prepare and the court must approve a written disclosure statement contain-
ing "adequate information" about the plan.2 ,5 Upon court approval, sub-
section 1125(e) absolves a person, who, in good faith and in accordance
with the bankruptcy laws, solicits acceptances or rejections of the plan from
any liability arising from the "violation of any applicable law, rule, or regu-
lation governing solicitation of acceptance or rejection of a plan or the offer,
issuance, sale or purchase of securities." '236
This so-called "safe harbor ' 2 37 provision contained in subsection
1125(e) shields a committee or its members who participate in a plan of
reorganization from prosecution under any state or federal securities laws.
The committee is also shielded from federal antifraud provisions which im-
pose absolute liability upon a seller of securities who makes materially mis-
leading statements or who fails to state a material fact in connection with a
sale.2 38 However, the "safe harbor" provision may not protect a committee
or its members who knowingly prepare or participate in the preparation of a
misleading or incomplete disclosure statement. Such actions would fail to
meet the good faith requirement the section imposes.2 39 Although subsec-
tion 1125(e) establishes a good faith requirement, the Code and case author-
ity neither provide guidance to committees seeking to meet the good faith
standard nor do they specify what liability a committee or its members may
face for failing to meet the standard.2'
234. Under U.S.C. § 1121 (1988), only the debtor may file a plan during the first 120 days
after the entry of the order for relief unless the court orders a shorter period upon a showing of
cause.
235. 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (1988).
236. Id. § 1125(e). This section stands alone in the Code in offering committees express pro-
tection from liabilities arising out of bankruptcy proceedings.
237. H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., 408-09 at 229 (1977).
238. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988).
239. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(e) (1982 & Supp. 1988). See also COLLIER, supra note 31, § 1125.03[7]
at 1125-38 and 39, (suggests that a plan proponent will meet the good faith standard provided its
disclosure statement does not contain a "knowing, intentional, material misstatement").
240. The court, upon the request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, may
designate any entity who fails to exercise good faith in accepting or rejecting a plan or whose
acceptance or rejection was not solicited in good faith. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (1982 & Supp. 1988).
A committee that elects to vigorously oppose a plan and solicit rejections may run the risk of
having the rejections solicited disallowed because they were not solicited in compliance with sub-
section 1126(e) of the Code. Collier suggests that a plan opponent seek a court order permitting
solicitation of rejections to be made on the basis of the proponent's disclosure statement or ask the
court to stay the solicitation of acceptances to permit the preparation of any additional disclosure




Plans of reorganization often include the creation of creditors' deposit
accounts and call for committees to act as agents to administer the funds
and distribute dividends to creditors. A pending objection to a claim is but
one reason for a delay in the distribution of funds. Such a delay can result
in the accrual of interest on the funds prior to distribution. The question
arises whether committees must file tax returns and pay tax on the interest
earned. Neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the Internal Revenue Code di-
rectly addresses this question and there is limited case law on the subject.
In In re Allen Wood Steel Co.,241 the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania ruled that a trustee acting as a disbursing agent
was not required to file state or federal tax returns or pay tax on the
$300,000 of interest income earned. However, the trustee must have acted
pursuant to a Chapter XI plan under the prior Bankruptcy Act. The court
reasoned that the money held was actually the property of the class of cred-
itors who were ultimately entitled to receive it and that the interest income
belonged to the creditors and not the agent. Additionally, the court ruled
that Congress' failure to include disbursing agents in that section of the
Internal Revenue Code,242 which requires receivers and trustees to file re-
turns, absolved the agent from any obligation to file.243
In In re Goldblatt Bros., Inc.,2" the creditors' committee sought a de-
claratory judgment that it was not responsible for paying certain federal or
state taxes. The specific objection was to the taxation of interest earned on
money held in a creditors' deposit account established pursuant to a plan of
reorganization or for filing income tax returns related to the fund. The
United States and the State of Illinois moved to dismiss the committee's
complaint, arguing that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate the committee's state and federal tax liabilities. The Goldblatt court
noted that other courts which addressed the taxability of interest on funds
241. 7 Bankr. 697 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980); see also In re Holywell Corp., 85 Bankr. 898
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988) (liquidating trustee not subject to tax liability); In re Sonner, 53 Bankr.
859 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985) (holding that creditors' trust established to liquidate property not
responsible for payment of capital gains tax resulting from sale of property).
242. 26 U.S.C. § 6012(b) (1982).
243. The court also concluded that the agent was absolved from filing information returns
under 26 U.S.C. § 6049 (1982) because the disbursing agent was actually an agent of the United
States Bankruptcy Court and therefore outside the scope of the section. Alan Wood Steel, 7
Bankr. at 702. Since the court's decision, Congress amended this section to require governmental
units, which presumably includes the Bankruptcy Court, to fie information returns. Thus, the
reasoning of Alan Wood Steel, regarding the duty to file information returns, is no longer
applicable.
244. 106 Bankr. 522 (Bankr. N.D. IM. 1989).
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created pursuant to plans of reorganization had failed to state the basis for
their assumption that a bankruptcy court has subject matter jurisdiction
over such a proceeding.245 The Goldblatt court engaged in an extensive
analysis of the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction and concluded that the credi-
tors' deposit account constitutes a crucial component of the debtor's estate
over which the court has core jurisdiction. Therefore, the taxability issues
related to the account are within the court's subsection 505(a)(1) jurisdic-
tion. The court left unanswered the question of whether, as a matter of law,
the committee must pay taxes or file tax returns.
Whether a committee must file tax returns2' and pay tax on earned
interest remains an open question. The lack of decisive case law or author-
ity under the Code or the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 suggests that com-
mittees which separately or jointly propose plans and which act as
disbursing agents should seek to clarify their potential tax liabilities in
advance.247
IV. DYNAMICS OF A CREDITORS' COMMITTEE
A. The Initial Decision to Serve on a Committee
Creditors frequently view service on a committee as an unwanted bur-
den and fail to recognize the opportunities committee membership presents.
A creditor who actively participates in the reorganization process can di-
rectly influence the manner and magnitude of the recoupment of a claim
which, to the creditor, may constitute a significant asset. As a committee
member, a creditor can endeavor to revitalize a debtor who may be a valua-
ble customer. Additionally, committee service may educate a creditor in
ways to improve its own internal procedures to minimize its future expo-
sure as a creditor and may prompt a creditor to revise its operations to
avoid duplicating the debtor's financial and operational mistakes.
Reluctance to serve on creditors' committees may stem in part from
prior experiences with inactive or ineffective committees."4 Creditors, es-
245. Id. at 526-27.
246. 26 U.S.C. § 6012(b)(2) or (4) and analogous state statutes.
247. 11 U.S.C. § 1146(d) (1988) permits the court to authorize a proponent of a plan to
request an advance legal determination of state or local tax liability related to a plan. In addition,
section 505 grants the bankruptcy court jurisdiction to determine the amount or legality of any
tax.
248. See Kerkman, The Debtor in Full Control: A Case for Adoption of the Trustee System, 70
MARQ. L. REv. 159, 193 (1987), (study examined certain Chapter 11 cases filed in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin prior to the adoption of the United States Trustee System and which concluded, among
other things, that creditors' committees generally failed to operate effectively); see also LoPucki,
The Debtor in Full Control - Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code? (Second
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pecially in cases that involve relatively few assets, also may be deterred
from committee service out of concern that they will not be reimbursed for
expenses they incur as committee members. 249 Although Congress failed to
redress the issue of compensation, recent amendments to the Code may re-
sult in increased numbers of creditors serving on committees. Additionally,
committees may play a more active part in successful Chapter 11
reorganizations.250
B. Internal Procedures
Although the factors that help committees to achieve success are some-
what elusive, successful committees seem to have several elements in com-
mon. One of the key elements to a successful committee is internal
structure and procedures. A committee must organize itself internally
before it can act effectively. Creditors that organize early in the case and
that establish a framework within which the committee will operate can
create a powerful voice to air the concerns of all creditors and can greatly
influence the course of the debtor's reorganization.
The creditors' committee should elect a minimum of two officers: a
chairperson and a secretary. The chairperson should be a person willing to
devote the time necessary to catalyze the committee, to make necessary de-
cisions, and to insure that those decisions are promptly implemented. The
often changing course of many reorganizations frequently requires the
chairperson to contact committee members between regular meetings to
discuss and secure votes upon questions which arise. Although a commit-
tee may select a chairperson based on the size of the various creditors'
claims, a committee is often better served when it selects a chairperson with
a proven record of experience with bankruptcy reorganizations or out of
court negotiations.
An effective committee secretary also contributes to the overall success
of a committee.251 The secretary should perform all of the committee ad-
Installment), 57 AM. BANKR. L.J 247, 250 (1983); In re B & W Tractor Co., 38 Bankr. 613, 615
(E.D.N.C. 1984) (most creditors' committees are "totally inactive and ineffective").
249. See supra notes 201-15 and accompanying text. In those jurisdictions in which the
courts deny reimbursement to committee members, creditors will be forced to weigh carefully the
costs of service, in terms of both time and money, against the potential benefits their participation
can produce.
250. See Kerkman, supra note 248, at 198-99, finding that, in pilot districts, the United States
Trustee's involvement in a Chapter 11 proceeding resulted in a dramatic increase in the level of
the involvement of unsecured creditors.
' 251. At the earliest possible date, the secretary to the creditors' committee should apply for
appointment by the court pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1988). See In re J.E. Jennings, Inc.,
100 Bankr. 749, 753 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (the secretary to the unsecured creditors' committee was
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ministrative work.2 52 He or she should mail notices to creditors, keep and
disseminate minutes of meetings, and prepare committee reports. Although
in smaller cases a creditor may perform these functions,25 3 larger cases may
necessitate that an outside party be retained who can devote the necessary
time to fulfill this role. It may be possible, for example, to retain employees
of trade associations or other related groups, which also may have word
processing or data processing capabilities.
A creditors' committee should adopt bylaws, similar to those adopted
by a business corporation, to serve as ground rules for the committee's in-
ternal operations. The bylaws should cover such subjects as the appoint-
ment of alternate committee members, voting procedures, quorums, voting
by proxy, and the formation of subcommittees. A committee that adopts
bylaws may prevent future disputes or confusion about the effectiveness of
actions the committee subsequently takes.
The effective use of subcommittees can greatly enhance the efficiency of
a creditors' or interest holders' committee. Subcommittees diffuse the over-
all workload of a committee and also permit the committee to address sev-
eral issues at the same time. Examples of common subcommittees include
those created to evaluate the debtor's prepetition and postpetition financial
condition, to identify and evaluate candidates to acquire the debtor or its
assets, to monitor and recommend improvement in the debtor's operating
procedures, 254 to negotiate the terms of a plan of reorganization or formu-
denied compensation for services performed prior to appointment). But see In re Interstate Res-
taurant Systems, Inc., 61 Bankr. 945 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (appointing credit adjustment company
nunc pro tunc as secretary to creditors' committee). See also In re Kingsway Purchasing, Inc., 69
Bankr. 713 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (denying committee's application to employ secretary); In re Cen-
tury Mach. Tools, Inc., 43 Bankr. 122 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (allowing compensation of committee's
secretary).
252. See In re Barsky, 17 Bankr. 396 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (the committee counsel was denied
compensation for work such as notifying creditors of meetings and drafting meeting reports,
which the court held should have been performed by the committee secretary).
253. A creditor who assumes the functions of a secretary may not be entitled to reimburse-
ment of the expenses it incurs in carrying out such a role. See, eg., In re Interstate Restaurant
Sys., 32 Bankr. 103 (S.D. Fla. 1983), (court made clear that only professional persons employed
by committees were entitled to fees (as opposed to reimbursement of expenses) and denied a com-
mittee's request for compensation of the chairman and secretary).
254. Although much importance is placed on the committee's adversarial relationship with
the debtor, committees can provide valuable assistance as well. For example, a committee can
greatly enhance a debtor's prospects for success by suggesting ways to improve internal opera-
tions. Frequently, the debtor can obtain goods or materials only on a C.O.D. basis, as opposed to
dated terms, causing severe cash flow problems. The committee can sometimes alleviate this prob-
lem by informing creditors about their rights to an administrative claim for shipments made post-
petition, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 503 (1988), or by working with the debtor to provide other
assurances to shippers such as field warehousing or secured financing arrangements.
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late the committee's plan,2 5 5 and to identify recoverable assets, such as pref-
erences and other avoidable transfers.25 6
C. Resolution of Minor Conflicts of Interest
Frequently, creditors on committees may themselves have received pref-
erences or other avoidable transfers. The committee member may under-
standably be concerned about a breach of its fiduciary duty to all creditors.
Should, for example, the member disclose the fact of a potentially avoidable
preference, perhaps to its disadvantage? If a member decides to contest the
recovery, should its delegate resign? In large cases it is not unusual for
large numbers of creditors to have received avoidable transfers. Resigna-
tion of their designees could cripple a committee's effectiveness at a crucial
stage in the case. Although replacements may be ultimately appointed, the
"start up" time required to become familiar with the committee's proceed-
ings may be substantial.
There exist no universal solutions to these questions. However, disrup-
tion of committee activities can be avoided where simple avoidance actions,
such as preferences, are involved, by a discussion early in the case of the
possibility of this situation arising. In addition, to formalize its procedures
and provide written notice to all creditors, a committee may want to incor-
porate a conflict of interest provision into its bylaws.
Assuming that a subcommittee will undertake a comprehensive investi-
gation and produce a report in the event the issue arises, members may be
told that disclosures which may be against their interest are neither neces-
sary nor desired. If a subcommittee to investigate preferences is to be
formed, its members might consist only of those creditors who are confident
they did not receive a preferential transfer. A member who did receive a
255. It is often useful to begin this process as early in a case as possible. A subcommittee can
explore such concepts as conditional earnout provisions, the feasibility of sharing the proceeds of
any post-reorganization sale of the debtor's stock or assets, or the receipt of securities in connec-
tion with the reorganization. After further investigation of the debtor's operations is concluded,
the committee should be in a position to formulate a minimum distribution percentage which can
be recommended to creditors generally. By defining the minimum criteria to be included in an
acceptable reorganization plan, the committee will be in a position to respond promptly to propos-
als made by the debtor or other parties, or to propose its own plan.
256. In In re Gander Mountain, Inc., 29 Bankr. 269 (E.D. Wis. 1983), the unsecured credi-
tors' committee identified and collected approximately $1.7 million in preferential transfers,
thereby increasing the distribution to unsecured creditors from 55% to over 75%. As part of the
collection effort, the committee afforded recipients of preferences a limited opportunity to satisfy
their liability by shipping goods, in this case sporting equipment, to the debtor in an amount equal
to the recipient's liability but valued at the creditors' wholesale cost. Many creditors chose this
option, taking advantage of their normal markup. This permitted the debtor to increase its inven-
tory substantially without adversely affecting cash flow.
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questionable transfer should abstain from voting on matters relating to
claims against it and probably should excuse itself during the corresponding
discussions that relate to such claims. While such procedures may prove
workable in the case of relatively simple and routine claims, disputes with a
committee member that involve more serious matters may warrant the
committee member's resignation.257
D. Committee Meetings
It is important for committees to meet periodically throughout the
course of the case. Although much of the substantive work can be accom-
plished by subcommittees, the committee should periodically meet as a
whole to discuss problems and make decisions based upon the recommen-
dations of its subcommittees. However, it may not be essential to meet with
absolute regularity. The developments in a case will often dictate the fre-
quency of meetings. When meetings are held, it may be useful to structure
them so that a portion is devoted to meeting with and questioning officers of
the debtor, or the trustee, about developments in the case. The remainder
of the meeting could be held in executive session to take up committee
business.
E. The Role of Committee Counsel
Finally, one of the most important elements of a successful committee is
the participation of knowledgeable and experienced counsel. Frequently,
committee members are businesspeople whose expertise can be applied to
maximum advantage only through the assistance of attorneys familiar with
reorganization proceedings. In addition to advising the committee about its
functions and duties, counsel can greatly assist it in asserting itself in the
posturing and leveraging among competing interests that is frequently de-
terminative of the outcome of the case.
V. CONCLUSION
Effective participation of committees of creditors and of other parties in
interest in Chapter 11 proceedings should not be limited to the largest "na-
tional" cases. The Code grants committees broad powers which, when
properly utilized, permit them to play a meaningful and sometimes domi-
nant role in the outcome of cases of any size being administered under the
Code. An active committee, represented by experienced, assertive, and in-
257. But see In re Bennett, 17 Bankr. 819 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1982) (unproven allegations of
fraud were held insufficient cause to deny committee membership to a creditor).
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novative counsel, can achieve the optimum result for creditors. Further,
the committee can assure that the members will not be called upon later to
personally provide that which they should have obtained for those they rep-
resent in the Chapter 11 process.

